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PREFACE 
There is a legend told about a dog which started to cross a bridge with a 
small bone in its mouth. About midway across, it stopped to view the water 
flowing in the stream below. Thinking the reflection in the water was in 
reality another dog with a larger bone, and thinking to better itself, it immedi-
ately plunged into the water, aiming directly for the bone. We who stand on 
the bank viewing this drama know the dog was foolish, that he lost the bone 
he had and risked the danger of ending up in deep water with little chance of 
climbing the steep banks which lead to safe ground. 
In this study I am only an observer. From my point of view I see the 
American free enterprise system threatened. by "foolish" plunges into 
socialism, during which our precious freedoms and heritage are lost, and then 
immersing ourselves in bureaucratic waters from which we must escape or 
perish. Many are not yet convinced that we are in danger or that this danger 
exists in the water industry. I'm not sure the words I have used in this report 
will warn or convince, but this has been my sole purpose in writing. 
I am not a rescuer-only an observer. I take full responsibility for state-
ments made. My only hope is that, as Americans, we will take a little more 
basic look at our government oriented water institutions and attempt a rescue 
before we leap further into total darkness. 
Frank W. Haws 
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PART I 
PURPOSE OF STUDY 
This study has been concerned with the human organizations that have 
been devised to manage water resources. Because the effort was to suggest 
some alternative methods to solve the problems of institutional restraints to 
effective water use, certain horizons have been viewed which extend beyond 
the limits of the ordinary water domain. Some of the concepts which will be 
discussed here pertain to the world and apply equally to all human activities, 
not exclusively to water. The purpose in doing this is to give more realistic 
meaning to the alternatives suggested and to hopefully define the real 
purposes and objectives of water related organizations. 
Emphasis is placed on the word "organization;' because it is felt that the 
way in which groups band together; the structure, regulations, and motivation 
built into the organization, determines whether the group will effectively meet 
its goals, how efficiently it will operate, and whether it is a valuable social organ. 
The proliferation of water resources organizations that exist within a 
given area is a restraint to effective utilization of water resources and a 
hinderance to desirable overall basin planning and management. The 
awareness of this problem was made known in a previous study (Haws, 1973). 
To organize is a necessity, but organizations have as much difficulty 
communicating with each other as individuals have, and hence many 
organizations competing for the same resource often bump heads and in the 
aggregate become ineffective social tools. 
Since water in manageable form does not occur uniformly over the 
earth, it follows that there will exist places with an oversupply to meet the 
needs of the local users and places with an undersupply. When such a 
condition exists naturally, and the area of abundance is spaced far from the 
area of scarcity, it may be too costly for man to attempt to reorder the 
natural water equilibrium. However, there are many places even within the 
generally less abundant areas where allocation by man could improve upon 
nature if it were not for barriers placed in the way by social or legal 
institutions. Often the allocation is not between spatially separated areas but 
between types of uses. Reallocation, or transfers from areas of abundance to 
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areas of scarcity, or from one use to a more profitable use, is prevented by 
some type of barrier or boundary such as a property line, a water right, an 
administrative decision, a legal entanglement, a municipal or district limit, or 
a government policy. Cost in such reallocations is not usually a restraint, but 
the alternatives to crossing the barrier or boundary are costly and often lead 
to over-investment in diverting works, transmission systems, and management 
organizations. 
All of the barriers mentioned have one thing in common. They stem 
from some type of institution or organization. The solution then to a better 
utilization of water resources, of extending supplies to the limit, and of the 
proper timing of importation and other "new water" investments is in the 
organization. Physical schemes are meaningless until the proper organization 
is invented, and with the right organization the physical schemes will follow 
like a sucking calf-not in obedience to law or dictum but vuluntarily to 
fulfill a need. 
This study is, therefore, a study of institutions-or more precisely, 
organizations. The intent at the beginning was to suggest ways of "moderniz-
ing" the existing organizations so that more effective use of the water 
resource could be implemented. Such a task now seems quite formidable. In 
the first place, if modernization implies an acceptance of the more recent 
trends toward big and powerful government agencies, then such a suggestion 
would not improve upon the present system. Big government is neither 
efficient nor effective. In the second place, many of the existing organizations 
do not have the internal capacity to effect change or to innovate, and at the 
same time many of these same organizations have been endowed with eternal 
life and seem destined to "live forever in their sins." Some organizations live 
on long after they have ceased to be effective social organs. Finally, the 
multitude of organizations which compete but which do not communicate or 
cooperate would not respond to an external suggestion to "get with it." 
Responsibility goes with authority and at that point in space or time where 
an organization's authority ends, so also does responsibility. To expect the 
multitude of organizations to accept responsibility for total resource 
development in an effective way is pure folly. 
Despite the formidable task of suggesting changes that might be made 
to improve the organizational structure of the water industry, some 
suggestions will be made; but the hoped for impact of this study will not be 
on the mechanics of how to organize, but rather on the principles and criteria 
which should be observed when creating new organizations. All too often new 
organizations are formed with no forethought as to the real purpose of the 
organization and with little or no regard for the fact that human nature plays 
a vital role in every organization or the fact that society is dynamic and 
continually changing. Much of this stems from the fact that no believable 
theory of organization has yet been stated and also from the fact that 
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pressure, urgency and excitement yield to unwise decisions and the birth of 
organizations. This is particularly true in the water industry where govern-
mental organizations have been the most widely accepted solution, and where 
fear has been the prime motive. 
PHYSICAL VS. SOCIAL 
Efficient and effective use of the natural water resource of an area is 
dependent upon the proper use of knowledge acquired in two important 
areas. The first area includes the understanding of the physical system and the 
laws of nature which control the occurrence, distribution, and disposition of 
water as it moves through the hydrologic cycle. Contributions to this 
knowledge area have come from many disciplines including meteorology and 
atmospheric science, physics, chemistry, hydrology, hydraulics, geology, 
plant science, soil science, statistics and probability, and other disciplines 
which attempt to explain phenomenon involving water. Progress has been 
made over the years and the misunderstandings which mystified earlier ages 
have been largely dispelled. In addition to the general concepts of the unity 
and continuity of the hydrologic cycle, knowledge specific to given 
watersheds and river systems has become available or can be made available in 
order to test the feasibility of alterations imposed by ma!l. With present 
knowledge available, engineers can design alterations to the physical system 
which can efficiently regulate and redistribute the water resource to meet the 
quantity, quality, and timing requirements for given purposes. Whether the 
alterations are effective it!. meeting societies needs is determined by how 
effectively knowledge in the second area is used. This area includes the 
understanding of human nature and the institutions and organizations made 
by man to construct and operate facilities to manage the water resource so 
that it can satiSfy I!pecified needs with respect to amounts, timing, and 
qUality. Contributions to this area of knowledge have been less exact, less 
scientific, and less coherent than contributions to the physical state. In fact, 
it is doubtful if any deliberate attemPt has been made, or can be made, to 
unify the thoughts of philosophers, religionists, socialists, psychologists, 
economists, lawyers, and politicians into a theory of organizations or to 
perfect a system whereby organizations and institutions could be designed to 
insure performance and effectiveness. The work of physical scientists working 
independently and without direct communicative intercourse and without 
agency direction, control, or correlation always tends toward a common 
understanding of physical truth. This is as it should be if each discovers a part 
of the truth. One would also expect the work of the social scientist to 
converge to a common understanding if the "scientists" in this knowledge 
area were also discovering truth. This may be happening in some areas of 
social need but h~ not yet taken place in the area of organizational theory. 
Organizations are just allowed to happen without sound direction or advice. 
In the water industry, local initiative, which has had the freedom to create 
organizations, has done so in a haphazard fashion, chOOSing those types of 
organizations which have been difficult to change and which, with the passing 
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of time have had an adverse effect on development and allocation. Bain et al. 
(I966), in a study of California's water organizations, has observed that, 
Local initiative ... can lead to the development of a haphazard or 
capricious pattern of local agencies supplying irrigation water-a pattern 
with probable adverse effects both on the allocation of water among lands, 
uses, and users, and on the efficiency of the exploitation of water 
resources . 
. . . an unplanned historical process has resulted in the allocation of rights 
to the use of economically scarce water among users, uses, and sites in a 
haphazard fashion which could only by unlikely coincidence approximate 
an economically efficient allocation. 
One of the major purposes of the research conducted under this project 
was to suggest some alternatives to the existing institutional patterns as they 
relate to the inefficient use of water within the State of Utah. The writer 
soon discovered that no alternative would have meaning unless it could be 
predetermined that the suggested changes would actually respond in the 
desired manner. This led to a search for a theory of organizations which 
would explain why organizations perform or not perform and define some of 
the principles which must be observed if effective social organs are to be 
created. That this information is not readily available is evidenced by the fact 
that the haphazard method of forming organizations continues and that no 
debate, particularly by public officials, is ever directed toward proving the 
effectiveness of one form of organization over another or to post the 
warnings necessary to avoid organizational mistakes. Occasionally some 
citizen generated debate may take place over optional forms of local 
government, but since the great American love affair with big government 
began in the 1930's legislators seldom if ever debate the merits of 
governmental organization versus non-governmental organization as a better 
means of accomplishing a social need. The debate is always over what kind of 
governmental organization will be created. This is like two painters discussing 
what color to paint the room, when if they stepped outside, they would 
discover they were in the wrong house. Legislators today seem to never step 
outside to gain the greater perspective. 
Solving this organizational problem is not easy, because, unlike the 
physical environment, it is not a case of man studying physical phenomena, 
but of man studying himself and being hampered by a non-objective 
viewpoint. The theories which attempt to explain the physical world are 
widely accepted and are sufficiently close to the truth as to be workable. 
Space travel, computers, television, and the other marvels of electronics are 
evidence that man is beginning to explain the physical world. There is no 
similar unity of theory which attempts to explain man's social world. The 
"scientific" disciplines which study man's social, political, and economic 
activities have not yet agreed upon unified workable theories. Social, 
political, and economic evaluations are still made on the basis of comparison 
and educated "opinion" -tempered in some cases by sophisticated analysis. 
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Continued poverty, crime, social unrest, dissension, recession, and inflation 
all attest to the failure of these "sciences" to solve the problems of social and 
economic wen being. Part of the problem which somehow has evaded critical 
analysis must be attributed to the organizational "systems" which have 
developed over the years. These systems have "set" the thinking of large 
masses of people, overriding personal ideologies and individual wills and 
forcing unwise social decisions. It is the purpose of this report to discuss these 
problems in the light of what the writer believes are fundamental principles, 
and then to specifically relate this to water organizations in the State of Utah. 
OPEN OR CLOSED SOCIETY 
There are essentially two opposing social philosophies each of which 
has real social benefits. The first, or open society, is highly individualistic and 
places great importance on personal freedom. Each individual is free to make 
his own decisions, to move freely within the system, and to compete in a free 
market for goods and services. This personal autonomy releases human 
initiative and creativjty and gives the individual a sense of personal dignity, 
but the society thus created is lacking in union among its members and 
therefore has the inability to give vigorous leadership and intelligent direction 
to the cause of social and economic well being. Union can only be obtained 
through voluntary covenants or contracts, otherwise the principle of freedom 
is restricted or destroyed. 
The second or closed society is socialistic or paternalistic, having as its 
primary role the regulation and direction of the lives of its members, 
supposedly in their interest and for their good. The members are regulated, 
disciplined, and regimented to the society's causes or goals. Action within the 
system is controlled by rules and procedures which are backed by the force of 
law and the police power of the state. The benefits of the closed society are 
unity, a feeling of common goals, and a sense of belonging and security. 
These benefits, however, are achieved by suppressing personal freedom which 
in turn curtails initiative and destroys human dignity. Because of this, the 
system is generally inefficient, costly, and unproductive. 
Perhaps the most serious and intense debate over the merits of the two 
philosophies occurred at the time of the forming of the United States 
Constitution. A choice had to be made, because there was no apparent way 
that the benefits of each could be attained. Freedom spawns many ideas and 
opinions, therefore little union of thought and purpose. Forced or organized 
union means suppression of freedom. Wisely the framers 'of the Constitution 
chose the open or free society and devised an ingenious system of 
government, based upon what they termed "self evident truths," to preserve 
and perpetuate it. The unity necessary to bind the people to one government 
is secured by covenant. Officials taking office are required to give their oath, 
a free choice, that they will uphold and defend the Constitution, and the 
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citizens in turn freely pledge allegiance and support to the same. Realizing 
that human beings are not always honest or moral and are subject to selfish 
motives, particularly when endowed with power, a system of checks and 
balances was designed into the system to hopefully prevent the unwise use of 
authority. 
During the first half of the nineteenth century society in the United 
States was, excluding slavery, essentially free and open. One of the freedoms 
available was the right to organize, or to form into groups so that the 
combined effort of many could be channeled into given purposes. Union for 
the purpose of achieving social needs was thus possible through the use of 
voluntary associations. The role of the government was limited to one of 
preserving peace and administering justice. 
UNION THROUGH ORGANIZA nON 
The first attempts at organization during this period were generally 
experiments in social brotherhood such as "cooperatives" and "societies." 
Many failed because the basic ideology or "truth" upon which the 
organization rested was not sufficiently vital to keep members excited. In an 
otherwise free society, the only recourse an organization has when members 
fail to comply with organizational standards is expulsion from the society. 
When forceful means are resorted to, the society ceases to be free. 
The potential that organization had for accomplishing desired purposes 
began to be recognized during this early period, but the multiplication of 
enduring organizations didn't get its big push until after the Civil War. The 
early beginnings, however, were described enthusiastically by a Boston cleric, 
William Ellery Channing. In 1829 he wrote, 
In truth one of the most remarkable circumstances or features of our age is 
the energy with which the principle of combination, or of action by joint 
forces, by associated numbers, is- manifesting itself. It may be said, without 
much exaggeration, that everything is done now by societies. Men have 
learned what wonders can be accomplished in certain causes by union, and 
seem to think that union is competent to everything. You can scarcely 
name an object for which some institution has not been formed. 
(Channing, 1829, p. 105-106) 
Many of the social experiments begun during that period failed. The 
differences that separated complete freedom and complete union could not 
be reconciled. But the benefits and powers associated with organized groups 
were manifest and the use of organizations in many different areas multiplied 
until today, nearing the third quarter of the 20th century, literally thousands 
of organizations exist. Organizations are so common and numerous today 
that perhaps the effects they have upon society are often overlooked. 
Whether an organization is a threat to individual freedom and open society or 
whether it contributes to social well being and the preservation of liberty 
depends upon the type of organization. 
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ORGANIZATION CREATES POWER 
Associations of living things exist because of some kind of power 
relationship. An organization, when well structured, creates power. The more 
perfect the organization, the greater the power. This potential power is the 
reason why people associate together-to accomplish through the unity of 
many what one could not do alone. But, the purpose of an organization is not 
to create power, but to use power. 
Organizations cannot exist without people. Therefore the real subject 
which needs study is people-human beings-not as groups but as individuals. 
It is not the group that senses light and darkness, or experiences sickness and 
health, or feels pleasure and pain. It is not the organization that laughs and 
cries. It is the individual. It is also the individual that achieves and fails, works 
and rests, lives and dies. It is the individual and not the organization that 
houses that elusive thing called life. To preserve it and enhance it, man 
hopefully creates institutions, or organizations. An organization is therefore 
only a means to an end. An organization uses the power it creates to 
accomplish a predetermined purpose. Organizations are not or should not be 
ends in themselves. 
Philosophies differ, but the writer supports the view that the purpose of 
life is not merely to survive but to gain happiness, and happiness in contrast 
to misery can only be measured by the internal feelings of the individual not 
by the outward expressions of a group. There may be expressed signs of 
happiness that others may observe, there may be principles or laws of 
happiness which man can discover and codify; but the only one who can 
measure and control happiI).ess by exercising choice, is the individual. 
The basic needs of life are food, clothing, and shelter, but the individual 
needs more than phYSical comfort. He needs association and acceptance with 
other people, an inner sense of belonging, a sense of his own importance and 
of his ability to produce. He needs productive work and he needs to achieve. 
He needs to learn through experience to choose those things which contribute 
to his happiness and to reject those things which make him sad. 
Each individual also needs to be reassured that the self-evident truths 
proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence are still valid and still 
self-evident. Every individual should expect the government to protect his life 
and his person from the ravages of war or invasion and from the criminal acts 
of his neighbors. He should expect to be granted the full use of his 
faculties-his arms and legs and voice to move about, work, and express 
himself and not to be restrained or imprisoned unjustly, and he should expect 
to be able to own and to hold the property, real or otherwise, he needs in 
pursuit of his happiness. Because life is dynamic, each individual is 
continually changing, continually becoming the type of person he chooses to 
be and overcoming the person he deems to be undesirable-but always by his 
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own choice. Not always does he make the right choice and so he seeks help. 
Organizations like the family, church, school, or club can assist the individual 
to learn, understand, and to experience, so that he makes better choices; but 
no person, organization, or government can give, grant, bequeath, or force 
happiness upon individuals. Happiness, the purpose of human life, can only 
be acquired through the proper and wise use of individual choice. The key 
word is choice-with freedom to choose for one's self. Organizations must, 
therefore, be formed with due regard for the effect the organization has upon 
freedom of the individual. 
Organizations, then, are merely tools designed to make it easier to 
accomplish an otherwise difficult task. If the task has been completed the 
tool is no longer needed and should be discarded. If the tool is not effective 
in accomplishing the task, it should be modified or exchanged for a better 
one. If the task has no social benefit, no tool should be designed, and no 
effort should be expended to perpetuate a tool which has no task to perform. 
The above statements are obvious, but when we consider that the tool we 
speak of is a collection of people, managed by people; and bound together by 
dynamic economic or social pressures, we begin to realize that, as a tool, 
organizations are complex and can be problems. 
POWER CAN BE MISUSED 
It has been previously stated that when people associate together for a 
given purpoSe that power is created. Not only is it created, but because an 
organization has leadership, power is concentrated. In fact, concentration-on 
a specific task or purpose emerges as the key to the strength, performance, 
and legitimacy of organizations. But concentration of power in one individual 
or a small group of individuals, should be viewed very cautiously and perhaps 
even feared. The history of mankind is replete with examples of misuse of 
power. In fact it can be stated as a true principle that most men when given 
power and authority, tend to misuse that authority for selfish or unsocial 
purposes. The men associated with the U.S. Constitution were keenly aware 
of this and thus tried to implement checks and balances into the new 
government. James Madison shows his understanding of this principle when 
he said, "All power in human hands is likely to be abused." Lord Acton was 
even more convinced when he said that "all power corrupts," and "absolute 
power corrupts absolutely." Nothing has happened since these words were 
first written to make them less true today. Therefore, one problem all 
organizations face is how to cope with power and the potential misdirection 
it induces. 
The tendency to misuse the power associated with position is a fact of 
life that must be recognized as an important element in all organizations. If 
leaders become affected by the power of the position they hold, and elect to 
direct the organization into paths unsuited to social good, the members of the 
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organization need to have some kind of recourse. In a business organization 
this has taken the form of counter pressures directed by organizations of 
workers or unions. The resultant power struggle has caused laws to be enacted 
and the police power of the state to intervene. The attendant loss of freedom 
and the use of compulsory direction has lessened the effectiveness of the 
business organization. In government this recourse is either built into the 
political system through free elections, or comes through external means such 
as revolution and rebellion. 
There is another selfish nature in man which must also be accounted 
for. This is the reaction man takes toward money. The accumulation of 
wealth beyond the ordinary needs of the individual or organization can tempt 
the man or the organization to purchase special privileges or favors, to 
influence legislation, to sway judicial opinion, or to subjugate the rights of 
others. This weakness in human nature gives rise to such ominous expressions 
as, "every man has his price," and "anything in this world can be purchased 
for money." The corporate business enterprise probably best solves this 
problem by distributing surpluses to many small ownerships and by being 
accountable to a free market system for survival. It is not without abuse, 
however. Organizations like labor unions concentrate large sums of money 
into a few hands whose acco)lntability in terms of effective production is 
nebulous and perhaps unmeasurable. This has attracted a criminal element 
into their leadership and serious abuse of power. Government agencies are not 
exempt from this problem either, where it manifests itself in a cancerous 
system of dishonesty among modestly paid employees who have power to 
grant favors, contracts, licenses, etc. 
Another problem inherent in organizations is related to the effect the 
organization has upon its own members. Whenever an individual becomes a 
part of an organization he necessarily gives up some of his own individual 
freedom. If the organization controls the individual's economic means it also 
has power to control the individual. One of the Federalist writers expressed it 
as, "control over a man's support is control over his will." In a more modern 
context the same principle was expressed by Rufus Miles of HEW and has 
since been labeled "Miles Law." He said that, "where you stand depends on 
where you sit." What this really says is that a man's position on any 
important issue will be shaped less by his own philosophy than by the goals 
of the organization he represents or the needs of the office he holds. This 
control of an organization over a man's will is not a conscious effort on the 
part of individuals to dQminate, but a built in function of the "system." In an 
ideal situation, the conscience and will of the individual coincides with the 
goals and purposes of the organization. In other situations, unless the 
individual has attractive alternatives, he will bend his standards and silence his 
conscience in order to retain position, prestige, or income. Even though the 
goals of the organization he serves contributes negatively to society, he yields 
to these goals. The individual is not to be condemned though for his action. 
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The fault is in the system. Probably the best example of such system 
subserviency is found in the bureaucratic service agencies of government 
where the organization has ceased to be a means to an end and has become an 
end in itself. 
EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS 
Throughout this report the words efficiency and effectiveness will be 
used frequently. It is important that the meaning intended be defined. 
Efficiency has different meanings in different disciplines but, in general, 
efficiency is a scaler term which represents the ratio between the input and 
output energies of a process. Thus, an engine is efficient if the energy output 
is high with respect to the energy input; an irrigator is efficient if the water 
consumed by his crops is high with respect to the water applied; and an 
economy is efficient if the value received is high with respect to the cost. It is 
obvious that efficiency is a product of management and technology-of using 
knowledge in such a way that friction, loss and waste are minimized. 
Effectiveness on the other hand, is not related to input-output ratios, 
but to final product. Effectiveness means producing results, but only those 
results which were planned and visualized at the outset and which have social 
value or purpose. Thus, a farmer may efficiently use his input resources-
water, labor and capital-to produce 50 bushels per acre of a new type of 
noxious weed seed. He will not be considered effective because the crop he 
produced has no value either to himself or to society. Effectiveness, like 
efficiency is a product of management, but in this case, wisdom is needed to 
set the goals and priorities and determine the purposes. A wise farmer does 
not intentionally harvest weed seed! Peter Drucker (1974) stated this concept 
precisely when he defined efficiency as doing things right and effectiveness as 
doing the right things. The first takes knowledge, the second wisdom. 
Unfortunately, wisdom is in short supply. 
Efficiency, when applied to organizations, is measured in terms of 
dollars of cost per unit of product. If things are done right the costs of 
production will be lower than if things are not done right. Efficiency then 
becomes a problem for managers and a job for accountants. Whether the 
product has value (effectiveness) must be judged by some other system. 
Efficiency can be motivated by the pressures of competition, whether it be 
competition in a free market for goods and services, or whether it be 
competition with other agencies for a slice of the government budget. 
Effectiveness means doing the right things. Therefore the test of what is 
right cannot come from within the organization. Determining one's own 
effectiveness is called self-justification and is merely a magnification of one's 
own reasons for existence or for continuing to do the things one is doing. 
Survival is not the end for which an organization was formed. Effectiveness 
10 
therefore, must be determined by some means external to the organization. 
The judgment should be clear cut and decisive and available to management 
so that changes can be instituted if necessary. The only real justification for 
having an organization is to produce results-to accomplish the ends for 
which it was formed. If it is not producing, it is ineffective and should be 
made effective by either increasing efficiency or changing programs. A 
program that cannot be made effective should be abandoned. 
Some types of organizations are more effective than others. The 
effectiveness seems to be coupled strongly to the manner in which the 
organization is paid. Business, for example is paid for what it produces. It is 
paid for perfornlance and results. In a free market system the test of 
effectiveness for business is whether the consumer is willing to buy. If a 
consumer has a free choice with alternatives to choose from and chooses to 
buy a certain product-the producer of that product has been effective in 
making the right thing. His efficiency in producing and his continuance in 
effectiveness is measured by a simple mechanism called profit and loss. 
Business represents the best example there is of an organization whose 
effectiveness is measured externally and in such a manner that management 
can respond almost immediately to effect changes to maintain effectiveness. 
A loss is an indicator that something is wrong. Continued loss can soon 
exhaust the resources of the company and bring an end to the business. A 
business must do right things or cease to be a business. 
PROFIT AND LOSS 
A business must also be able to react rapidly to changing conditions. 
The environment in which a business operates is dynamic and subject to 
frequent change. New technology, rapidly increasing population, urbaniza-
tion, and other changes that influence consumer preference, all affect 
business in a manner that can spell profit or loss depending on how well 
management responds to change. Fortunately business organizations are 
designed to manage change. In fact, business, the only type of organization 
that is paid for performance, is the only organization designed to manage 
change. It is forced into this position because of the law of opposites. It has 
two choices: it can exist or not exist-live or die, depending upon whether it 
makes a profit or a loss. Too often people forget that profit has its 
opposite-loss, and the probability of a loss is greater than the probability of 
a profit. The so called "profit motive" is not, therefore, a synonym for greed, 
but merely the instinct for survival. To live or die is the question. Profit 
means life for the business, loss means death. Staying alive, when the decision 
is in the hands of the consumer, demands efficiency and ingenuity on the part 
of the managers. It means doing things right and it means doing the right 
things. 
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The profit-loss system of business organization operating in a free 
society is the most productive, most efficient, and most democratic system 
yet devised by man. It produces only those items wanted by the consumer, it 
exacts a cost only from those who benefit, and it allocates the resources of a 
nation only to those uses which have social need. And it does all this 
automatically, unless interfered with by the controls imposed by government. 
Despite the many advantages of a profit-loss system, public confidence in the 
system has deteriorated in recent years. One of the reasons the profit-loss 
system has come under ridicule and why some business men actually 
apologize for profit is that the managers and economists have labored under 
the false premise that profit is a motive for business and should therefore be 
maximized. Profit is not a motive, but a test of performance and the premium 
for the risk of uncertainty. It is what makes economic progress possible by 
investment in new jobs and it is what pays for the economic satisfactions and 
services of a society. The theorem of profit maximization has caused business 
to aim at what is possible rather than of what is desirable and in doing so has 
caused business to be less than socially responsible. Business does have the 
responbility to make a profit, but only the minimum profit is required to 
cover its own future risks, the profit to enable it to remain in business, and to 
maintain intact the wealth-producing capacity of its resources. To define a 
minimum profit is to assign social responsibility to business and requires 
careful analysis by management as to what business it should be engaged in. A 
socially responsible free enterprise system is possible. 
ALWCATION BY BUDGET 
In contrast to those organizations which are paid for performance 
through a profit-loss system are those organizations that are paid out of a 
budget allocation and a non-profit, non-loss system. These organizations are 
allocated revenues from a source which is not tied to what they are dOing, but 
obtained by tax, levy, assessment, or tribute. Governments naturally fall into 
this division and as long as they confine their activities to "governing" this is 
a legitimate way of being paid. The purpose of government is to "govern"; 
that is to control, regulate, or restrain. Therefore, the organization of 
government is deliberately designed to prevent change. Government was not 
designed nor intended to be a "doer" except in its role as protector and 
defender. Armies and police forces must necessarily be paid out of a civilian 
controlled budget. To do otherwise would result in a competition to prove 
which army could win the most wars at the least cost. This would be gross 
misdirection. When government departs from its function of governor and 
defender and gets into the business of doing, the budget system fails to 
function. 
Judging the effectiveness of budget paid organizations is difficult, if not 
impoSSible. Being paid for performance directs toward performance-but 
being paid by a budget allocation directs toward a budget. Therefore 
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performance in a budget allocated organization is the ability to maintain or to 
increase one's budget. And the budget, by definition is not related to 
contribution but to good intentions. There is no such thing as loss in budget 
allocated organizations-only miscalculations in estimating or over expendi-
tures due to unforeseen circumstances. A manager does not have an internal 
indicator like a profit-loss statement to tell him when the organization is not 
performing or misperforming. This means that the organization is extremely 
resistant to change and finds it difficult to abandon an ineffective program. In 
fact, it seldom knows that it is ineffective. 
COST RECOVERY 
There are other types of institutions or organizations that seem to 
function somewhere in between a budget system and free profit-loss 
enterprises. These are those enterprises that are paid for the costs incurred 
and which provide a service that is essential to the user and cannot be 
provided by a substitute. Hospitals and universities fall into this category. No 
adequate test of effectiveness is available for this type of organization, and 
therefore management for effectiveness is difficult. Judging a university by 
the number of Ph.D.'s awarded may be a misdirection and produce a negative 
effect upon society. Likewise, which is the most effective hospital, one with 
all beds full, or one with few beds occupied? Should a hospital teach 
preventive medicine or over treat the sick? Is a hospital a tool merely for the 
doctors or does it have other functions? If it has other functions how are the 
costs recovered? The direction any organization takes is linked to the way it 
is paid. Paying just for costs directs toward increased costs until the user 
rebels and seeks an alternative. 
Organizations can therefore be evaluated on the basis of how they are 
paid. If a market situation exists, that is, if choices are available to a 
consumer, the result will be performance. This is inherent in a free enterprise 
system because being paid for performance directs toward performance. 
Similarly, a budget based operation tends not to perform because being paid 
by a budget directs toward the budget. And being paid for costs directs 
toward increasing costs. These principles apply regardless of ownership of 
property. The socialist nations who insist on government ownership of 
property are now finding that performance is still best obtained by paying for 
performance. Paying a worker for lifting a sack of potatoes will direct tpward 
lifting the sack of potatoes-no more. Performance in a competitive market 
means using more than muscle, it means using ingenuity, thought, and vision. 
It means unleashing creativity and initiative. This is perhaps the greatest 
argument there is for a free market system. Profit is not a dirty word, but 
only a numerical system of measuring the effectiveness of a business choice, 
and of directing effort toward performance. 
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WHAT IS OUR BUSINESS 
An organization should be a means to accomplish some end. The 
success or effectiveness of the organization depends primarily on how well 
this "end" or purpose is defined. TIle organizational structure is important 
but is patterned to meet the intended purpose of the organization; therefore 
structure should not be considered until the purpose has been fully and 
adequately stated. Strategy before structure should be the motto of all 
organizations. 
Defining the purpose or "business" of the organization is too often 
glossed over or given inadequate attention. Simple as it may seem, defining 
the "business" is not easily done. To be most effective the decision as to what 
the purpose is must be made by the manager of the organization. The one 
who has authority to direct, concentrate, and establish priorities must have 
the proper vision of his job or he will most likely misdirect. Attempts to 
establish purposes outside of the management circle automatically creates a 
communication gap that is difficult to cross, and the result again is often 
misdirection. TIlis is one of the problems of government services and agencies 
when the purpose, so called, is stated by a legislative body and the 
organization structured and regimented before anyone really knows what is 
expected to be accomplished. The business world does not have this type of 
harness placed upon it and therefore succeeds or fails on the basis of how well 
management envisions its destiny. The articles of incorporation of a business 
organization do not state the effective purpose of the business, but only give 
it license to function. 
In order to be effective an organization must be able to concentrate its 
forces and resources upon specific tasks which contribute to the overall ends 
of the organization. If the purposes of the organization are not well defined, 
the leadership of the organization will find it difficult to decide which tasks 
are important and which tasks should be avoided as being wasteful. The 
important tasks will automatically be defined if the overall purposes are 
clearly understood. Not all organizations are able to make such a clear 
distinction of their purposes, however. 
A management technique has been suggested by management consul-
tant, Peter Drucker (l974), to assist organizational leadership in defining 
its purposes in such a way that specific tasks are automatically suggested. 
Each manager, regardless of whether his official title is president, director, 
administrator, or manager, should ask himself this question: "What is our 
business and what should it be?" and then thoughtfully answer it. The answer 
can only come after careful analysis and there may not always be one right 
answer, but a decision has to be made and the vision so clearly represented 
that everyone in the organization can contribute to its realization. Drucker 
(l974) said: 
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Only a clear definition of the mission and purpose of the business makes 
possible clear and realistic objectives. It the foundation for priorities, 
strategies, plans, and work assignments. It is the starting point for the 
design of managerial structures. Structure follows strategy. Strategy 
determines what the key activities are in a given business. And strategy 
requires knowing what our business is and what it should be. 
Common vision, common understanding, and unity of direction and effort 
of the entire organization requires definition of "what our business is and 
what it should be." 
Nothing may seem simpler or more obvious than to know what a 
company's business is. A steel mill makes steel, a railroad runs trains to 
carry freight and passengers, an insurance company underwrites fire risks, a 
bank lends money. Actually, "what is our business?" is almost always a 
difficult question and the right answer is usually anything but obvious. 
Drucker goes on to indicate that a business's purpose is first defined by 
the needs of the customers and this first step in determining purpose is to 
define who the customers are. Thus the first part in analyzing the purposes of 
the organization is to step outside of the organization and look at its activities 
from the viewpoint of a customer, or as a recipient of its products or services. 
Entrepreneurial imagination is helpful at this stage to catch the proper vision. 
Examples of successful attempts to so define a business are seen in the Sears 
Roebuck story where the purpose of becoming the "buyer for the American 
family" has made Sears the largest retail business in America, and in the Bell 
Telephone story where nationalization of the industry was averted because 
Thomas Vail saw the purpose of the telephone company as "service" and his 
customers as including the state regulatory agencies. The examples given here 
illustrate the nature of abstract statements of purpose which point the 
direction of the business and which lead to the formulation of specific work 
objectives. Also, the statements do not confine the business to specific tasks 
like "making steel." 
Every organization should analyze its reason for being and attempt to 
define what its "business" is, even those organizations which may consider 
themselves to be "non-business" organizations. Government service agencies, 
universities, hospitals, irrigation companies, and water conservancy districts 
could well benefit from an analysis of why they exist and for what purposes 
or ends they are supposed to be the means of achieving. Even these types of 
organizations have "customers" which, if identified, might assist the 
organization to adjust effectively to the part of the question that asks, "what 
should our business be?" 
One problem a government service agency has in answering the 
question, "what is our business and what should it be?" is that the agency is 
structured and the purpose described by legislation in legislator's language, 
and leaves the "manager" without authority to act and without reason to 
question. There is, therefore, no common vision, no common understanding 
and unity of direction and effort, and no foundation for priorities, strategies, 
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plans and work assignments. It is little wonder that government service 
agencies are poor "doers." 
Water services organizations have traditionally been government ori-
ented-some with taxing authority and some without-none have ever been 
truly "businesses." Even the private irrigation companies are not businesses. 
None have ever, therefore, had occasion or the ability to ask themselves the 
question "what is our business (purpose) and what should it be?" These 
questions need to be asked, though, if only by the public and customers who 
pay the bills. Perhaps this is the first step before reprivitizationl can take 
place. 
WATER-A DIFFERENT RESOURCE 
Water as a resource is unlike all other natural resources. Despite man's 
consistent use and reuse for over 6000 years, the total quantity and quality 
remains the same-water cannot be created or consumed. Unlike the forest it 
cannot be replenished by seeding; unlike oil or coal it cannot be diminished 
by burning; and unlike a mineral resource it cannot be processed and parts 
consigned to a waste pile. Unlike all other resources water exists every-
where-in the atmosphere, on the surface, in the ground, or stored in the 
tissues of plants and animals. Water has innumerable uses. Besides quenching 
a thirst, water performs thousands of tasks utilizing its ability to be a solvent, 
a cleanser, a lubricant, an agent of transport, an agent of energy transfer 
including mechanical and thermal, and the uses derived by medical therapy 
and recreation. Water is associated with all the life processes of man and is 
truly indispensable. 
The properties of water that give it so many uses are also the properties 
that make it difficult to manage. Within the narrow temperature range 
existing on the earth's surface, water exists in all of its forms, solid, liquid and 
vapor, and is constantly changing phases as energy from the sun is absorbed 
or reradiated by the earth. Large masses of water in vapor stage are carried by 
the winds for many miles and distributed as liquid in random fashion as 
influenced by the sun's angle, elevation, or position on the earth with respect 
to the land and liqUid water masses. Thus an uneven distribution of liquid 
water occurs over the land masses of the earth and man has to go to the 
sources-the rivers, the lakes, the springs, and underground to fill his dipper 
and- satisfy his wants. 
Despite the awesome nature of water as a universal resource, the 
consumer in today's society is usually unconcerned with all its attributes. His 
chief concern is that water flows from his tap upon demand. He has come to 
1 Reprivitization is a term used by Drucker (1969) to mean a return from govern-
mental to private organizations. 
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expect this and is willing to pay the reasonable cost he is charged. But 
bringing water from the stream or lakes or wells to the home requires 
organization and effort. As a community has grown from a small initial 
settlement to a megalopolis the number and variety of organizations has also 
grown. Little thought and no integrated planning has gone into the formation 
of these organizations until today a haphazard array exists. The hydrologic 
unity of the water service area has sometimes been disected and divided until 
apparent absurdities have appeared. It is possible that continued growth will 
eventually demand a consolidation and removal of inefficiencies. Expert 
planning at that point in time will be needed to make sure consolidation will 
not worsen the situation. 
The problem, then in an area where water supplies are overtaxed by 
growth is to invent an organization that can combine all the resources into a 
unity, can allocate the water to the use that is most efficient economically, 
and be efficient and effective without becoming imperialistic. Formation of 
such an organization must resist the temptation to rush into a governmental 
agency and first answer the question-"What is the business of such an 
organization and what should it be?" 
The manner in which the question is answered will determine the 
strategy to be used which will then allow organizational structures to be 
designed. Answering the second part of the question gives a reevaluation to 
determine if the right choices have been made. This is the "repentance" part 
of organization which is often unused. Consider, for example, what would 
happen if one wanted to create an organization to be the developer and 
distributor of a state's water resources. If, in answer to the question, "what is 
our business," the term "water conservation" was used what would be the 
resulting organization? (The term "conservation" does not have the same 
meaning to all people so it is doubtful if a common understanding would 
exist throughout the organization so immediately the organization is directed 
toward ineffectiveness.) 
The word "conservation" means the carefully planned preservation or 
protection of something, in this case, water. It also means the prevention of 
exploitation, destruction or neglect of a natural resource. With this 
connotation the work of the new organization would be to protect and to 
control, two bona fide functions of government. But this organization would 
have another function which is not governmental, that of building and 
operating the facilities needed to develop and distribute the water. It is likely 
that the governmental system would be adopted in this case and a 
government agency, supported by accompanying laws and funded from taxes, 
created. Later, as evidenced by history, it would be seen that the agency was 
not a good doer, that it was costly, unresponsive, and arbitrary, and that it 
made wrong social decisions. It would be too late then to ask the second part 
of the question, what should our business be; because the agency would be 
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entrenched with a vested right to the tax dollar and could not be divested or 
terminated. If the question had been asked earlier, however, a different, 
organization could have resulted. 
If the word "service" had been substituted for conservation, a different 
picture would have unfolded. Service means to be a servant, to aid, benefit or 
contribute to the welfare of others. There are two reasons why this is not a 
governmental function. One is that service requires someone to be a recipient 
of the service, a master-servant relationship. The recipient or master must 
have a choice of whether to accept the service and to also dictate the kind of 
service desired. Government gives no choice to the recipient. Another reason 
that government cannot function as a servant, except to protect and defend, 
is that the type of interchange proposed is conducive to favors taking, 
bribery, and discrimination. The interchange is therefore, not free but 
controlled by strict and inflexible rules. This prevents true "service." The 
organization resulting from an answer of "service" to the question would 
have been non-governmental, in other words, a business. Since business is a 
proven doer, and since the user of the business is master, the organization is 
responsive, less costly, and makes decisions which meet social needs. If 
management sets goals to meet a determined minimum profit, social 
responsibility is more nearly assured and social impacts of the organization 
more certainly recognized and provided for. 
Water does not acquire economic value until it is used. It is not a 
commodity that can be stored in a vault and still retain value. Its value lies in 
its use. The farmer uses water to protect his crop from dessication and to 
permit the plant growth processes to occur; the householder uses water to 
drink, to cook, to clean, and perhaps with energy added, to heat and to cool. 
The municipality uses water to put out fires, flush the street of debris, and to 
transport human wastes out of town. Industry uses water in processes 
necessary to the production of goods. All uses require a constant availability 
and often a continuing supply with respect to time. No use is completely 
static-all are dynamic and require water in motion. In all, the hydrologic 
cycle becomes channeled through the user. 
The only way in which the user can be placed within the hydrologic 
cycle is to alter the natural flow system and physically divert the stream to 
the place of use. This requires energy and organization. It would be absurd to 
think each user would have to be a diverter. Hence, the pooling of uses into 
one diverting and conveying system becomes the obvious answer. To this end 
many organizations have been formed. The ultimate purpose of each 
organization is the same-to get water from the place where nature has 
concentrated it to the place of use, preserving or creating the quality and 
pressure needed for the use. This is a service and whether the use enhances 
the business productivity as with an irrigated farm or car wash, or whether 
the use is just a convenience as with the urbanite who "rakes" his leaves with 
a jet from his hose, it is the service the user pays for. 
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The services concept has been foreign to most if not all of the 
water-diverting-conveying organizations formed to date. Particularly is this 
true with the agricultural organizations-the irrigation companies. How would 
the irrigation companies answer the question, "what is our business-who are 
our customers?" In actual practice the irrigation company manager has never 
asked this question, but if he were to carefully analyze the function of the 
company and how it came into being as a single legal entity to represent the 
rights of many individual users, he might correctly determine that "we are in 
the business of protecting water rights and our share holders are our 
customers." The mutual irrigation company is a user-cooperative-an exclu-
sive group of water users who share in the cost of diverting and conveying, 
and who strictly adhere to the tenant that each share holder is entitled to a 
part of the hydrologic cycle to the exclusion of all others. Holding fast to this 
tenant has perhaps misdirected the efforts of the organizations. The mutual 
irrigation company is not an efficient producer or conveyor of water, it is not 
well managed and it is not really effective as a social organ to get the best use 
from a scarce resource. The farmer does not need an organization to "protect 
his water right." In fact, he does not need a water right. What he really needs 
is water! And an organization committed to this task, delivering water, would 
render a far greater service to society and to the farmer than the user-coop he 
tenaciously hangs on to. 
How would a quasi-governmental agency like an irrigation district 
answer the question, "what is our business, and who are our customers?" The 
district is tax supported, is enclosed in boundaries set by law, is limited by 
law to a single-purpose water use, and measures its performance by its ability 
to keep expenditures within its taxable revenue-or perhaps that should be 
stated in reverse-to keep taxable revenue equal to expenditure. It appears 
doubtful that it has ever been asked the question about its purpose other than 
to build a distribution system, and its customers become vaguely discernible. 
In a market situation it is the customer who decides if the seller is pushing the 
right product or giving the right service. The consumer, by exercising choice, 
is the controlling agent. Not so in a government service organization. The 
consumer is forced to pay the bill, but he has little to say about the product 
or the service. The government service organization then, tends to become an 
end in itself and not the means to an end. It may operate efficiently but it is 
not an effective social organ. 
Similarly, the mUnicipal water department has not correctly assessed its 
role or purpose of existence. Its answer to the question would probably be, 
"we are in the business of treating and delivering water." And the question 
about who its customers are may receive a vague answer like "the city." But 
who is the city? Some may say the customers are the householders, 
apartment owners, businesses, and industries that pay a monthly waterbill, 
but that is not correct because these people do not control the business; not 
in the same sense anyway that the customer controls the business of the retail 
merchant. A business soon goes out of business if it cannot satisfy the needs 
of its customers. In some sense the "voters" control the company because 
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they have some voice in the providing of capital through the sale of bonds, 
and they have voice in the selection of the public official who hires the head 
of the water department. Are the "voters" then the customers? Or are the 
customers those who complain until a problem is corrected? Is the water 
department misdirecting its efforts? Consider that it evaluates its performance 
on negative values, such as satisfying the complaints of citizens; or on the 
engineering statistics like per capita consumption rates of increase or 
decrease, or costs of production in dollars per acre foot, or number of 
connections in service, or total amount of water delivered. 
The problem of defining the purpose of governmental service organiza-
tions worsens as the level of government and degree of bureaucracy increases. 
Thus agencies like the Bureau of Reclamation, the Soil Conservation Service, 
the Forest Service, and the Corps of Engineers fmd it impossible to even ask 
the question "what is our business (purpose) and what should it be" let alone 
attempt to answer it. These organizations are not means to accomplish ends, 
but are ends in themselves. They hold vested interests in the federal budget 
which they use to enhance the organization and accrue benefits to their own 
employees. The nearest one could come to defining their purpose is 
"survival," which is an inadequate social goal for any organization. Members 
within the organization are quick to quote the federal laws which give them 
authority to function but these laws do not define the purpose or "business" 
of the organization. 
Equally ineffective and without purpose is the partnership which links 
the federal bureaucracy, the Bureau of Reclamation in most cases, with the 
state bureaucracy, the Water Conservancy Districts. Operating by itself, a 
district compares with a large municipal water department-operating with a 
certain amount of efficiency but not fully performing because of its 
dependence upon tax revenue and police force. When coupled with the 
federal agency the district loses all sense of purpose, and tends to make wrong 
decisions. The district becomes the repayment collector for the Bureau of 
Reclamation and the chief lobbiest in Congress for project appropriations. 
Water distribution, the movement of water from a place of origin to a 
place of use, is a marketable service requiring management, labor, and capital. 
Water distribution is therefore a business opportunity which can fulfill a 
social need. There is no need or justification for using government service 
organizations to perform this function. Not being able to derme their purpose 
or to concentrate their efforts on the right tasks makes government service 
agencies unperforming social organs. 
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PART II 
WATER INSTITUTIONS 
MUTUAL IRRIGATION COMPANIES 
Historically, the most prominent and certainly the most numerous, 
water institution in Utah has been the private association of water users 
commonly known as the Mutual Irrigation Company. The word mutual is a 
descriptive term to indicate the manner in which the company functions but 
is not included in any of the official names of the separate irrigation 
companies. The companies are "mutual" because they are owned by and 
operated for the benefit of the members, but they do not resemble traditional 
"mutual" companies such as insurance companies or savings banks which 
operate without capital stock, or stockholders. The irrigation company in 
Utah is actually a unique hybrid organization resembling traditional mutual 
forms in action, but clinging to vestiges of a "business" under which law it 
was originally formed. The irrigation company is a stock company which does 
not operate a "business" and a mutual company which is owned by 
stockholders. Having a resemblance in some respects to both types of 
organizations, in actual operation the irrigation company is like neither of 
them. The common element in both a stock company and a mutual company 
is that both operate a business for profit. The differences between the two 
forms are in the manner in which the business profits are distributed and the 
way in which leadership is acquired. In a stock company the profits which are 
not retained to build the business are distributed to the stockholders as 
dividends. Leadership is acquired through vote of the membership (stock-
holders). In a mutual company the profits result in an adjustment in the price 
of the product or services to the membership. Thus an insurance premium 
may be lowered, the interest earned on savings increased, or the price received 
for agricultural products increased. Leadership in a mutual form is generally 
by a self-perpetuating committee or board and not by voting of the 
membership. In a stock company the business is operated for the benefit of 
the stockholders, but no stockholder is required to participate in the 
operation or production aspects of the business. No stockholder is involved in 
decisions of management and generally has no interest in what management 
does as long as the profit-loss statement indicates that right decisions are 
being made. His liability is limited to the amount of stock he owns and he can 
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unemotionally detach himself from the company if share values begin to 
drop. 
A mutual company is not only operated for the benefit of the members 
but also by the members. Thus each member contributes to the product of 
the company such as money for reinvestment or to amortize loss, or farm 
products to be marketed. Management efficiency is assured through freedom 
to withdraw membership and join with competitors. In some cases the 
membership may be liable for losses incurred by the business. 
The irrigation company differs from these two forms in one important 
aspect. The irrigation company does not make a profit. In other words, the 
irrigation company does not operate a business. It was initially allowed to 
incorporate under the business laws of the state with some vague under-
standing that the water received as a shareholder was a "dividend" on the 
stock. This is an erroneous concept because dividends are immediately linked 
with profits and the generation of new wealth through the use of capital 
investments. Water, being a product of nature and not of man, is not 
considered capital and is much like electricity, of no value until used and even 
then it does not become a substantial part of the finished product. Therefore, 
water as a dividend on a capital investment shortchanges the investor 
considerably. 
Another difficult concept to understand concerning irrigation com-
panies is the reason for issuing shares of stock which represent capital 
investments in a non-business. What capital does an irrigation company 
actually own? As a rule, irrigation companies do not own real estate, 
equipment, buildings, machinery, or any of the normally considered capital 
or wealth producing items. The only thing the irrigation company owns 
which has any semblance to capital, and which even then, is intangible and 
has substance only in law and custom, is a water right. It is doubtful if this 
water right can be considered capital because of itself it does not produce 
wealth. The irrigation companies could have organized without capital and 
resembled more the mutual companies they operate like. 
The irrigation company can thus be described as a non-business, 
operating without capital by its members for the mutual protection of their 
water rights. Being without capital it cannot build or even rebuild extensive 
water distribution systems, being a non-profit-non-loss organization it can 
only incur costs, and being operated by the membership it can only share 
costs and management decisions. Having a water right as its only valuable 
asset, its major function must be to protect that right against all encroach-
ment. All other activities such as cleaning and maintenance of the ditches, 
headgates, etc., and the allocation of water to the shareholders are secondary 
to this major task. 
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The protective nature of the irrigation company was its primary 
attraction at its inception. The physical systems had already been built and 
therefore venture capital was not needed. The water law was undergoing 
change and courts were beginning to adjudicate water claims. To consolidate 
the users under one ditch or diversion into an enduring entity to protect and 
preserve the system was the motivating force behind the incorporation of 
water users into irrigation companies. 
The organizational structure was designed to resist change and to this 
end it has been most effective. In fact, many companies today are rmding it 
difficult to adapt to land use changes caused by urbanization and industrial-
ization. But the more serious problems caused by this rigidity is the waste of 
the total resource caused by multiple inefficient systems which refuse to be 
consolidated and improved. For over 30 years this problem has been observed 
and exposed by competent researchers, but no change has been forthcoming. 
The writer would like to emphasize at this point, that the solution to 
this problem of inefficient water use and failure to consolidate irrigation 
systems lies in the organization structures and not in the people who make up 
the membership of irrigation companies. As with any organization the people 
are bound and directed by the organization. It is true people staff the 
organization, but the organization directs. Thus an irrigation company directs 
toward water rights protection and away from change and management for 
efficient water use. The older generation can pass away assured that those 
who follow will still protect, still resist change, aI1d still unmanage. Not until 
an organizational change is effected, will the effort be redirected into other 
paths. 
With the present resemblance to a business organization the irrigation 
company could most easily redirect its efforts by actually becoming a 
"business." This would require a simple change in the articles of incorpora-
tion to permit the company to make a profit and contract with its 
shareholders to assure delivery of water when needed at a price. To make a 
profit the company management would need to be autonomous and have 
freedom to operate in a market environment and to develop a clear 
understanding of who its customers are and what its business should be. 
Instead of protecting a water right the company would be in the business of 
providing a needed service and at the same time efficiently utilizing a valuable 
natural resource. 
GOVERNMENTAL WATER SERVICE AGENCIES 
Perhaps the oldest water service organization of a governmental nature 
is the municipal water department. Some of the oldest water systems in 
America go back to the early 1800's when pipes were made from hollowed 
out logs. The need in those days was not so much for drinking water for the 
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inhabitants but for fire protection. Since fire protection is definitely a social 
responsibility and not an area for business entrepreneurship and competition, 
it was natural for local governments to provide this kind of protective service. 
The other municipal uses of water naturally followed and local government 
has become by tradition the most likely organization to provide water service 
within a community. These organizations do not have an exclusive right to 
this service, however, because in some areas privately owned water utilities 
.have successfully assumed this responsibility. In Utah, the first attempt to 
provide municipal water service was done through a separately chartered 
corporation created by the territorial legislature known as the "Great Salt 
Lake Water Works Association." It came after the chartering of Salt Lake 
City and was not a part of the city government but the city was allowed to 
subscribe for capital stock not to exceed $100,000. The function of the 
company was later assimilated into the city government. A more recent 
provision in the law has also permitted quasi governmental units to be 
organized most often with taxing authority, as a special single purpose water 
district. Often this type of governmental agency supplies water needs in the 
unincorporated areas outside of municipal boundaries. In Utah these special 
improvement districts are a creation of county government and are in turn 
accountable to the County Commission. Much of what will be said about 
municipal water departments is also true of special water districts. 
Municipal water departments are not always efficient and in many ways 
are not effective organizations. Being a product of governmental expansion 
the organization structure is determined by elected officials who in most 
cases have no managerial training and no insight into the type of structure 
needed for effective service to the community. The manager or department 
head works in this predetermined structure without full autonomy, without a 
vision of what the social purpose of the organization is, and under the stress 
of satisfying his bosses in city hall. The workers within the organization 
reflect this lack of purpose and unity of direction and are generally 
uninspired, less than productive, and underachieving. The organization lacks 
entrepreneurial leadership and is content to do things in the same way year 
after year. Like all government service agencies it clings to the past and 
generates few new innovative ideas. 
Some of the problems of governmental domestic water service agencies 
are associated with the size of the system and the resources of the agency. 
Throughout Utah today there are numerous small domestic municipal water 
systems with number of customers ranging from 20 to 500. These systems are 
too small to employ a full time professional manager and are thus run by a 
member of the elected council and perhaps a hired worker with some pipe 
fitting skill. This lack of management skill however, is less serious at this level 
than it is at the deciSion-making level within the town council. When this 
council lacks persons trained in hydraulics and hydrologic principles, wrong 
decisions are often made with regard to size and location of reservoirs, 
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pipelines, and distribution networks. For this reason the council often hires 
engineering consultants to assist them in obtaining an adequately designed 
system. Consultants are hired to design workable systems which will satisfy 
all the requirements of the various regulatory agencies established by 
government. Sanitary and environmental requirements must be met along 
with restraints imposed by granting or lending agencies. The consultant is 
familiar with all these requirements and thus designs systems which qualify. 
He is therefore a non-innovator, clinging to the past and shying away from 
practices which may attract the attention and questioning of the regulatory 
bodies. He designs systems which he knows will pass regulations and stands a 
fair chance of being built. After all, his fee is based on a constructed project. 
In doing so, though, he contributes to technological obsolescence and 
preservation of the past. 
The small town also lacks the capital resource necessary for adequate 
water distribution systems. Uke other utilities a water system is highly capital 
intensive. Most small towns lack a tax base which is large enough for capital 
financing of water distribution systems. Money must therefore be borrowed 
using the general tax obligations or the expected revenues as collateral for the 
lending agency. General obligation bonds require the approval of the citizens 
and this is not always given. Grants or loans from the federal agencies are 
therefore sought. These federal monies have much the same effect as direct 
tax revenue, being a source of money which is not linked to the performance 
of the spending organization. The spending of federal funds on domestic 
water systems by municipal water departments, regardless of the size of water 
system, is further removed from the conscience and an obligation to perform 
than is bonded revenue. Thus, there is even less of an incentive to perform. 
The larger water departments have more money to work with, but their 
problems with efficiency and effectiveness are not fewer. In fact beyond a 
certain size the water departments become bogged down in bureaucracy and 
become susceptible to many of the ills of big government. Water revenues are 
usually more than sufficient to pay general expenses and investment-
repayment and since the surplus is turned over to the general fund of the 
mUnicipality for use on non-water related functions, the incentives to 
efficient use of labor and material are lacking. A searching attitude for new 
and better ways of doing things is not present and the service to the customer 
is not improved. Service to customers is replaced with an effort known as 
"customer relations," which is concentrated on answering complaints and 
placating complainers-coupled with a public relations program. Survival of 
the organization is assured; but "empire building" is somewhat restricted 
because of limitations on growth within set boundaries. 
The influence of the method used to pay an organization in the 
discharge of its purposes cannot be overemphasized. It has been stated earlier 
that to pay for performance directs toward performance. Other words can be 
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substituted for the word performance and the statement remains correct. 
Thus to be paid out of a budget directs toward establishment of the budget 
and to be paid out of tax revenue directs toward the collection of taxes. In 
these latter two examples, performance is left out. The organization does not 
need to perform; that is, it does not need to be efficient and it does not need 
to satisfy social objectives. Such performance is not required when costs are 
provided by a budget which is assured by the collection of a tax. Municipal 
water departments are not paid to perform because their money comes from 
tax revenue and tolls collected and budgeted by the municipality. If the 
revenue from tolls collected from water users is not sufficient to meet 
expenses, the deficit is made up from general tax revenue and future toll rates 
increased. Surpluses from the collection of tolls go back into the general fund 
for allocation to the other city departments. A deficit or a "loss" is not a 
threat to survival of the department nor is it taken as an indicator that things 
might be done wrongly or inefficiently. In a like manner a surplus or "profit" 
is not an indicator that right decisions are being made as to the real social 
value of the department. As long as the tax revenue is available as a "prop" to 
support inefficiencies and as long as the water department represents an 
uncontrolled government monopoly backed by the power of force and police 
action, the organization will remain directed toward inefficiency, non-perfor-
mance, and ineffectiveness. 
Associated with the direction toward non-performance is the lack of 
innovative entrepreneurial management. No risks are involved, therefore no 
need to change is felt. In fact changes are openly resisted. Clinging to the past 
is a lUXUry market controlled businesses are not permitted to enjoy-not for 
long anyway, or they are forced out of business. The water department has 
reinforcement to its own built in resistance to change from the regulatory 
laws and agencies, including trade associations, which codify practices into a 
rigid, unbending system. Even new technolOgical changes including new 
materials and devices developed by service industries find slow acceptance by 
these organizations. 
The trade associations, particularly the American Water Works Associa-
tion, has admitted in recent publications that domestic water service to users 
could be improved. Their answer to the problem is to better educate the 
operators and individual workers in the water departments. This writer 
contends that the problem is not with the persons employed but in the 
organizational systems. 
One other aspect of mUnicipal water departments is also linked to the 
way income is collected and dispersed. Because the "profit" or surplus after 
expenses is turned over to the general tax fund, no allocation for research is 
ever made. In general the research for water department problems is done by 
universities, state health departments, industrial suppliers, federal labora-
tories, and private water utilities. Trade journals usually represent the link to 
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communicate the research information to the department user. A large part 
of the research information is never implemented and much of the research 
effort is misdirected into areas which may not be directly related to real 
world problems. An example of a research system which has been effective in 
contributing to social betterment while also improving business is the 
telephone company's Bell Laboratories. Supported by profits from the 
telephone business, the laboratory was asked to research methods of 
improving telephone service. When a discovery was made the implementation 
link was direct and not through a convention speech or an article in a trade 
journal with the hope someone might listen or read and be converted. Jhls 
extremely effective type of research has not found place in the water service 
industry because there are no direct profits to support research, and no means 
of implementing discoveries that might be valuable. The remote researcher 
has difficulty in directing his research toward the right problems. 
WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICTS 
Municipal water departments may have problems of inefficiency and 
ineffectiveness as a result of their organizational defects, but despite this they 
have accomplished many things and have made some contributions toward 
social betterment. The situation could be improved by introducing risk and 
profit into the management scheme, but even without this they far out 
perform the latest creation of government in the water industry, the water 
conservancy district. 
The water conservancy act was originally passed in Utah in 1941, but 
the concepts embodied in the act would not have been tolerated by the Utah 
public a decade earlier. Even the Wright Irrigation District law, which found 
acceptance in California in 1896, was never fully transferred to Utah because 
of some of the ideologic tenets promoted in the law. The idea of taxing all 
the people to pay for projects which directly benefit only a few and to pay 
for projects which many felt should be the responsibility of private enterprise 
was resisted by the Utah people until the federal government overturned these 
concepts with its promotion of the welfare state during the 1930's. 
As was stated in an earlier publication, the water conservancy ideology 
was a creation of the Federal Bureau of Reclamation. Like all federal 
bureaucracies the original "ends" or purposes of the bureau were soon 
forgotten and the "organization" became the "end." Survival became the 
most important purpose of the organization and real social values became lost 
in the struggle. Survival of the Bureau of Reclamation was dependent upon its 
continuancy in the work of building the nation's dams and developing entire 
river systems whether such development was needed or not. Complete river 
development requires lots of money and it was obvious that the farmer users 
of the water could never be made guarantors of such high repayments as 
would be necessary. Hence, the Bureau pushed for the creation of a new 
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vehicle-a state governmental subdivision with broad powers of taxation-no 
limitation on how the taxes would be spent as long as it was water oriented, 
and almost complete immunity from pressures and directions from the 
taxpayer. The organization would not have to meet either the market test of 
profitability, or the political test of a free election. There would be no one to 
question whether the decisions made were right and no signals to the 
organization which would indicate whether it was doing the right things. 
There would be no need t6 innovate, no need to change or to cast off the 
obsolete, and no need to perform. Such an organization would tend to and 
does make wrong decisions. 
I 
The writer has learned through conversations with taxpayers in various 
parts of the state that most of the citizens of the state are completely 
ignorant and uninformed as to what the Conservancy Act says or as to what 
conservancy districts are doing or have the power to do. They may hear 
through the public media that the governor supports the district and hear 
certain of the bureaucratic leaders under the governor reiterate this support, 
or they may read some of the "public relations" material put out by the 
district; but few actually know what the district really is or how it is spending 
public money. This is probably what the writers of the original bill intended 
when they attempted to "take politics out of water development." What they 
really intended was to remove the spotlight of public attention and make it 
difficult if not impossible for the public, the tax paying public, to interfere 
with the project. The writer did fmd some informed citizens in the upper 
moUntain valleys of the Weber River, but they chased him from their 
property thinking he represented the "Weber Project." 
Because of this general lack of knowledge about conservancy districts 
the writer feels it is important to discuss certain aspects of their organization 
and operation particularly as it pertains to the efficient and effective 
utilization of the water resource. If the conservancy district concept is a 
restraint to effective use then its abolishment or restructuring must be part of 
the alternatives considered in this report. 
A first reading of the Conservancy Act gives one the impression that an 
organization could be created that would meet social needs by managing the 
water supply and building the needed distribution systems. The language 
sounds good, but when one stops to consider that governmental oriented 
organizations have a notorious reputation for not performing why should this 
particular act behave differently? As Drucker (1974) has said, "to turn any 
area over to 'government creates conflict-creates vested and selfIsh interests, 
and complicates decisions ... to tum something over to government makes it 
political instead of abolishing politics." He further stated: 
... We are very good at creating administrative agencies. But no sooner are 
they called into being than they become ends in themselves, acquiring a 
28 
"vested right" to grants from the treasury and to continuing support from 
the taxpayer, and achieve immunity to political direction. No sooner, in 
other words, are they born than they defy public will and public policy. 
These words are probably true at all levels of government but probably 
more true at the federal than at local levels particularly if the local taxpayers 
have recourse to a free election mechanism to effect changes. The 
Conservancy Act provides for a political subdivision of the state which should 
make it local in nature and responsiveness to the local taxpayers. This 
responsiveness and "local government" flavor has been averted in two ways. 
First, the leadership of the organization is not elected by taxpayers. Instead 
the leadership, the board of directors, is approved by the judge of the judicial 
district in which the conservancy district is formed. This means that despite 
the fact that the Conservancy District Act was a creation of the legislature, 
the organization and the development of the water resource becomes a 
judicial function and not a legislative perogative. The fact that the taxpayers 
elect the district judge somehow meets the "due process" clause of the 
Constitution, but under the same theory why don't the judges also appoint 
the mayors of cities and commissioners of counties? 
Whenever a vacancy occurs in the board of directors of the conservancy 
district a new appointment is made by the judge after receiving a 
recommendation from the remaining board members. Thus the board 
becomes self-perpetuating and completely unresponsive to the taxpayers in 
the district. A self· perpetuating board of directors may be permissible in a 
business such as a mutual savings bank or a mutual insurance company, where 
the business is regulated by the market, but without that market force and in 
a government capacity the practice is intolerable. 
The second factor, which destroys the local government flavor of the 
district, is the strong contractual ties the district makes with the federal 
government. This, of course, was the intent of the act in the first place-to 
link the federal government with a state government unit so that "local" 
pressure could be demonstrated in support of federal projects and so that 
repayment of the project could be guaranteed-with the backing of the police 
power of the state if necessary. The Act provides for the contractual 
arrangements with the federal government but does not make such contracts 
mandatory. A district could exist without such contracts but none of the 
districts in Utah are known to exist without this link today. The Salt Lake 
County Water Conservancy District originally started out without this federal 
link and made considerable progress developing a good quality underground 
water supply. What inducements caused it to change its direction is not 
known by the writer, but it began its link to the federal system by 
contracting with the Salt Lake Metropolitan Water District which has a 
repayment contract with the federal Deer Creek Project. The link was made 
complete when the Central Utah Water Conservancy District was formed and 
a repayment contract promised obligating the SLCWCD to use Central Utah 
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Project water. Since that time the SLCWCD has ceased to develop or fully 
utilize underground water and buys higher priced treated river water from 
Central Utah, via the Salt Lake Metropolitan Water District. The economic 
soundness of this practice is questionable. 
Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District presently has 13 fully 
equipped and operable deep wells. The water from these wells is of good 
quality and does not need to be treated except for contingent disinfection. In 
addition the district has water rights in several springs which also deliver 
water not needing treatment. The wells have already been drilled and 
equipped and tied into the distribution system so when costs are compared 
with water purchased from Central Utah capital amortization need not be 
considered. Also, since the cost of the water rights in the springs has also been 
paid for, that water is essentially free-not being purchased annually nor 
involving annual energy costs to put it into the system. Using the figures 
reported in the 1970 annual report of the Salt Lake County Water 
('onservancy District and the accountant's report for the same period the 
following can be deduced: 
The district bought, acquired, or pumped 14,055 acre feet of water 
from the following sources: 
From I J wells operating 15';{, of capacity 
From springs 
Purchascd from Metropolitan Water District 
Other (exchanges) 
Acre Feet (' ost 
4,252 
1,808 
7.988 
7 
14.055 
$ 54.313 
253.858 
$308.171 
Without the contract with the Metropolitan District, Salt Lake Cou,nty 
W(,D could have supplied the total demand from the existing wells and still 
had reserve capacity as follows: 
From 13 wells operating 45<';, of capacity 
F rOI1l sp rings 
Other cxdlangcs 
A savings of $161 ,411. 
Acre Feet ('ost 
12.230 
1.808 
7 
14.055 
$146.760 
$146.760 
The savings would actually be greater than this since the power rate 
would decrease when operating over a longer period of time. Assuming the 
power rate reduced to $8.00 per acre foot average instead of the $12.00 used 
in the calculations, the savings would approximate the total revenue collected 
from the one mill advalorem tax. $216.000, making taxation unnecessary to 
the tlnanciaI success of the district. 
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Whenever one reads the PR literature put out by the conservancy 
districts one expects that the next time he turns on his tap there will be no 
water. The nagging fear of a water shortage is constantly imaged before the 
reader. The district must use fear tactics in order to maintain its control over 
the public purse. If the truth were exposed, the economic blunders of the 
bureaucratic system might create enough citizen reaction to put the 
conservancy districts out of action, but as long as fear is created and apathy is 
present this system is secure. 
Consider again the Salt Lake County WCD. The 1970 demand on its 
system was 14,000 acre feet of water. The 13 existing wells have a combined 
capacity of 32,000 acre feet per year. Adding the present spring flow to this 
gives the district a present capacity of 34,000 acre feet per year. In addition 
the district has pending applications on ftle with the State Engineer for 20 
new wells with a combined capacity of 170 cubic feet per second or about 
124,000 acre feet per year. A recent groundwater study by the U.S. Geologic 
Survey (Hedy et al., 1971) estimates the annual usable recharge to the 
groundwater basin in Salt Lake County to exceed 100,000 acre feet per year. 
Therefore, the district could meet a water demand over seven times its 1970 
demand without any importations and treatment of out of basin water. 
Furthermore, the groundwater supply is less likely to fluctuate than surface 
supply and is therefore a more reliable source. The 20 new wells could be 
drilled and equipped for a cost well under $2,000,000. Now consider the 
alternate chosen by the district: Imported water must be treated and to do 
this, a $9,000,000 treatment plant plus a $6,000,000 investment in a terminal 
reservoir and aqueduct has been built with a total capacity without furthet 
capital investment of 40,000 acre feet per yeat. Just slightly over the present 
capacity of the 13 well system which was built for under $500,000. The 
treatment plant is dependent upon the completion of the Bonneville unit of 
the Central Utah Project, however, and the cost of thls uni~ will yrobably 
exceed $500,000,000 before completion. Salt Lake County's totiIT commit-
ment from this source is 50,000 acre feet which represents an annual cost of 
$3,500,000. That's a tremendous cost to bring treated water into an area that 
already has an excellent usable supply. 
Why doesn't tl;1e Salt Lake County WCD develop more of its 
groundwater? The answer is locked into the type of contract it has 
encumbered itself within its purchase agreement with the Metropolitan 
Water District. The accountant's report (Haynie et aI., 1971) for 1970 gives 
the following: 
Contract agreements relating to the future purchase of water provide 
that the District will not buy elsewhere until it has bought at least 3,000 
acre feet per year from Metropolitan at an agreed price of $40 per acre 
foot and that additional water (over the 3,000 acre feet already 
contracted) will be purchased from Metropolitan, or in any event, pay for 
water in quantities not less than those shown in the following tabulation at 
a minimum price of $40 per acre foot: 
31 
Calendar 
Year 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
Acre Feet of 
Water Per Year 
(Additional) 
2,040 
2,290 
2,540 
2,740 
2,940 
3,140 
3,330 
3,520 
3,710 
3,900 
Commencing with the calendar year 1980, the Conservancy District 
will buy from the Metropolitan District, or in any event, pay for sufficient 
water above the 3,000 acre feet and in excess of that provided for as set 
forth in the foregoing tabulation, so or to the extent that at least one-half 
of all the water distributed by the Conservancy District shall be water 
which has been acquired from Metropolitan. During the calendar year 
1980, and all years thereafter, the Conservancy District will buy at least 
one-half of all its total domestic water requirements from the Metropolitan 
District until the Conservancy District is buying from Metropolitan District 
a total of 10,000 acre feet per annum. The minimum rate for water sold 
under the agreements shall be $40 per acre foot, but this rate may be 
increased in future years based on increased operating, maintenance and 
administrative costs of Metropolitan District works. 
The District also has a supplemental agreement with Metropolitan for 
the purchase of additional water. Under this agreement, the District will 
purchase its regular annual quantity of water as outlined above plus an 
additional five per cent (5%) of that amount each year at the contract price 
of $40 per acre foot. The District may then purchase additional water to 
the extent it is available at $20 per acre foot. 
There are several parts of this contract that need to be emphasized. 
First, the contract prevents the purchase of water from any other source until 
the agreed upon amounts have been satisfied. This is a restraint of free trade 
that would not be tolerated except in a governmental monopoly and forces 
the district into higher prices. The same tactic is used, however, by the 
district when it sells water to its wholesale customers. These contracts prevent 
the customer from purchasing water from any other source and also dictate 
to the customer when and how much water he can use from his own 
previously developed wells. There are no alternatives offered or open to the 
customer. Private controlled monopolies have never been able to exercise this 
kind of dictatorial power. 
Another part of this contract makes payment mandatory whether the 
water is used or not. Instead of a sales contract it is actually a repayment 
contract obligating the district to guarantee repayment of a portion of the 
project cost. In case of default the federal government has first lien on the 
taxing authority of the district which by law can be extended beyond the one 
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mill limit to whatever amount is needed to meet the obligation. This then 
reverts back to the individual property owner who is forced to pay the tax 
imposed or have his property confiscated and sold. This points to another 
disadvantage in governmental agencies. They operate by law which by nature 
is a forcible procedure. Al1laws can be enforced and are backed by the police 
power of the state. Again the repayment nature of this sales contract between 
the district and the federal government (via the Metro District) is repeated 
when the district makes contracts with its customers-the bill must be paid 
whether the water is used or not. Contrasting this with a private monopoly 
operating in the utility business, a customer still has some choice. Water is an 
important part of life but it isn't necessary that water be imported and 
delivered to one's home to survive. Disregarding the convenience of piped 
water, a person can choose to dig his own well, build a cistern, or haul water 
from a distant stream. The point is, if he chooses not to use the monopoly's 
distriBution system, he doesn't have to pay for it. In the government's 
monopoly operating under force oflaw, that choice is not available. 
Another part of the contract which limits the district to high prices is 
the requirement to buy at least one-half of all its water from the Metro Water 
District until the limit of 10,000 acre feet per year is reached. This limits the 
amount of well water that can be used. In 1970, the district bought 54 
percent of its water requirement from Metro. They were required to buy at 
least 7027 acre feet which limited their well production to 5210 acre feet 
(960 acre feet more than they actually pumped). By contract then, the 
district is prevented from using its cheaper underground source. In explaining 
this to the public however, Mr. Hilbert, the district general manager, 
explained in an article submitted to Western City Magazine,March 26,1971: 
The District has applications on file with the State Engineer's Office for 
development of a total of 125 cts. from groundwater sources. Of this 
amount, 40 cts. has actually been developed and is used in current 
operations. At the present time, the wells are used only during the peak 
demand summer months. We regard this supply as a reserve to provide 
needed water during dry periods when surface and imported supplies may 
be limited. 
What Mr. Hilbert didn't say was that the district was prevented by 
contract from using underground water and that the "reserve" is not a bank 
account to be drawn upon in times of shortage but is an annual flow which is 
part of the hydrologic cycle in Salt Lake County and which if the district 
does not use is discharged into Great Salt Lake and evaporated without use. 
The other feature of the contract which should be mentioned is the 
price specified for water used or contracted for. The present price of 40 
dollars per acre foot is an arbitrary figure designed to repay the project 
construction cost and is geared to the customers' ability to pay and not to the 
marginal value of the water. As is noted this $40 is a minimum and subject to 
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increase when the federal agencies decide its time to change. Because the 
Central Utah Project is costing so much more per unit of water produced than 
the Deer Creek Project it is likely water or repayment for that project will be 
much higher than $40. The SLCWCD is obligating itself to repay 50,000 acre 
feet worth of project costs. When these new contracts come out they will 
probably reflect this higher cost and will contain other restrictive clauses 
which will further prevent the district from utilization of underground water. 
The things mentioned with regard to the Salt Lake County Water 
Conservancy District are typical and apply to all water conservancy districts 
in Utah. The Weber Basin WCD has many of the same restricting features in 
its contract with users plus an additional set of restrictions which pertain to 
agricultural users. One of the most prominent features about agricultural 
water is the low price, less than $3.00 per acre foot, which represents the 
subSidy being paid by the domestic users. Here again the price is arbitrary, 
based upon what someone has judged to be the ability of the user to pay. The 
user does not make this choice. The agricultural user is also told how much 
water he needs and where he can use the water. Like all other users, the 
farmer does not actually buy water, but obligates himself to repay part of the 
project and consents to have the county tax collector assess and collect his 
repayment fee along with his other property taxes. He thus becomes subject 
to a tax lien and loss of his farm if he becomes delinquent. 
The Weber Project is also a good example of the tendency governmental 
service agencies have to make wrong decisions. The Bureau of Reclamation 
was originally invited to Davis County to assist in a small storage project to 
provide additional irrigation water for some of the dry bench land. The 
Bureau used the opportunity to inveigle support for the entire Weber River 
Basin development. Without reviewing all the history, suffice it to say that as 
a result, the Bureau designed dams for every conceivable site, caused the 
formation of the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District, and built a project 
that far exceeds the demands for water in the basin and again, completely 
ignored the underground supply. To guarantee repayment of the $90,000,000 
project the emphasis has had to be placed on domestic use of water. 
Sub-conservancy districts, special improvement districts, and two-pipe distri-
bution systems have had to be promoted in order to find enough repayment 
guarantors to keep the project alive. As a result Davis and Weber counties 
now have the highest domestic water rates in the state, local agriculture has 
not increased and the District still has water it can't find a buyer for. 
Overinvestment in unneeded facilities is typical of federal governmental 
service agencies. What has been true in Weber will also be true in the gigantic 
Central Utah Project. The public investment in this project will probably 
approximate one billion dollars before all facilities are completed and many 
are not and will not be needed. 
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PART III 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The recommendations suggested here will probably never be imple-
mented. The writer feels however that he must suggest them knowing that 
many will differ and argue in defense of the status quo. Eventually, though, 
change must come, and if society is to be improved those changes must 
incorporate some of the principles enumerated in this report; namely, 
freedom to make individual choices, protection by government from those 
who would destroy, and the opportunity to use individual resources to 
achieve or fail. These are in essence the things that make this country great 
and were known in the beginning as self-evident truths. This report is a 
defense of the American way and an attack against paternal government and 
socialism. Though primarily directed at water service organizations the 
principles are not confined to this resource. 
The primary conclusions of this study are: 
1. The efficiency and effectiveness associated with any social task is 
highly dependent upon the organization formed to accomplish that task. The 
reasons or the laws of organization which explain why one organization is 
more effective than another are not fully understood and delineated at this 
time. A pragmatic approach to the problem does suggest, however, some 
facets that appear to be true. It can be observed, for example, that: 
(a) Organizations create power. This power can be used to 
invent, manufacture, and distribute to society the products which improve 
life styles and raise so called "standards of living." The variety of foods and 
food packaging, clothes, building materials and transportation and communi-
cation equipment available today is evidence of this power. This type of 
organization or group of organizations is known collectively as "business." 
The power of organizations can also be used to coerce and demand 
concessions from those organizations which produce by controlling the 
workers and causing work stoppage and strikes. The labor union demonstrates 
this use or misuse of the power of organization. A third example of the power 
of organization is the governmental agency which uses law and force to 
accomplish what supposedly are legitimate social tasks. This last examplifies 
the least creative and most wasteful use of the power of organization. It 
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should not be hard to observe that the most creative and least wasteful use of 
organizational power is found in "business." 
(b) It can also be observed that the power of organization can be 
misused or abused. Business has at times exploited the worker, unions have 
engaged in criminal activities and often made demands which have a negative 
impact on society, and governments have become despotic and dictatorial 
having little regard for human life. The tendency is for people who seek and 
obtain great power to abuse that trust in selfish pursuits. This is a trait of 
human nature which must be coped with in any organization. 
(c) A final observation which can be made is that the efficiency 
and effectiveness of an organization is linked to the method by which the 
organization receives its income. In a free society, the business organization 
must please its customers to remain in business. This calls for creativity, 
innovation, and entrepreneurial leadership. Abuses, when they occur, are 
most often linked with the reinvestment of excess profits and the temptation 
to buy special privileges or to influence legislation. A labor union on the 
other hand has no customers to please and little accountability for the use of 
funds extracted from its members. The "dues" paid by the members do not 
buy performance from the union leaders. Governments use the force of law 
to collect the revenue it needs and parcels it out to departments on a budget 
basis. Performance, again, is not purchased by the tax. The following truism 
can be stated as pertaining to the method of payment to an organization. 
"Paying for performance, directs toward performance-paying for a budget 
directs toward collecting the budget." 
2. The water organizations in the State of Utah are non-businesses; 
most are governmental in nature, receiving revenues from taxes and 
expending their funds from a budget allocated out of such revenue. These 
organizations are, following the pattern of similar organizations, non-creative, 
non-innovative and in many cases are inefficient and ineffective in meeting 
optimum social needs. 
3. The most desirable organizational form to satisfy social needs, as 
proven and demonstrated through past experiences, is "business." It is not 
sufficient to be "business like," but to be truly a business in which revenue is . 
"earned" through the performance and service rendered. Free choice must be 
maintained and protected by government, but government should not 
attempt to operate or control. The motto for such organization should be, 
"let every social need become a business opportunity." 
If a business organization is the best form to manage water develop· 
ment in the State of Utah, then the following steps are recommended to 
allow movement in that direction. 
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1. Amend the Utah Constitution by repealing Section 6 Article XI to 
allow municipalities the same option as other water users, to dispose of 
through sale or lease its water rights and associated physical works. This does 
not release a municipality from the responsibility to protect its citizens from 
fire danger or to provide its citizens with drinking water. It does allow the 
city the opportunity to get out of a water distribution business and to turn 
this over to a bona fide business which can operate without boundary 
limitations and which can effect economies of scale by consolidating with and 
interconnecting with other water systems. Typical case studies of problems in 
this area are included as an appendix to this report. 
2. Repeal the Water Conservancy District Act, Chapter 9 Section 73 
Utah Code Annotated 1953. This the writer knows is probably like asking 
someone to reverse the flow of the Colorado River, and when he suggests this 
to colleagues they just smile knowingly and turn the conversation to other 
subjects. But, the suggestion is not without merit. The alliance that exists 
between the water conservancy districts and the Bureau of Reclamation is 
diverting public resources into expensive and unnecessary projects and leading 
to complete domination and control of water resources by the federal 
government. Utah used to fight for state control of water resources, but since 
the formation of the Central Utah Water Conservancy District, particularly, 
the fervor has lessened. Federal control and domination in a resource area like 
water which could be made a business opportunity is not good for Utah. 
3. Have state assume debt to federal government. If the water 
conservancy districts should be disincorporated some method of dispOSing of 
the repayment con tracts with the federal government would have to be devised. 
If the Utah congressional delegation could effect an agreement with the 
federal government an arrangement might be made as follows: The State of 
Utah would assume the present repayment obligation of an Bureau of 
Reclamation projects in the state. Since this amounts to about $2,660,000 
exclusive of Central Utah (USBR, 1965), and since the total assessed 
valuation of all property in Utah (1973) is $2,145,248,000 an advalorem tax 
of 1.2 mills would suffice. The Central Utah Project when complete would 
add another 0.8 mill so that a total assessment of 2 mills for the next 60 years 
would liquidate the debt. The state should then insist that all titles to water 
rights, physical properties, and rights of way be relinquished to the state. The 
state in turn could then lease or sell these facilities to private business 
enterprises to operate in a free market mode wherever the market existed. 
Any new projects envisioned should be decided by the market test and not by 
federal bureaucrats. 
4. Reestablish the water "privilege" concept and eliminate water 
"rights." In the early period of settlement in Utah water was controlled by 
each county and users were granted "privileges" to put such water to use. 
When the users need ceased so did his "privilege." No right was vested and he 
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could not sell or trade his right to another. Perhaps this method placed a 
heavy burden an the Probate Judge who parceled out the privileges but the 
concept does have some merit. Allocation from one use to a higher ~se is 
assured and the waste by an inefficient user is controlled. Water is not wealth 
producing capital and should therefore be treated differently than other 
resources including land. When a person owns land and desires not to utilize it 
for his own purposes he may lease it to his neighbor. The owner still retains 
responibility for the land and stil). pays taxes on his investment. With water, 
though, the user may lease his right to another and make no further 
investment in the right, not even taxes. An example of this is an irrigation 
company in Weber County which, because of extensive subdividing has ceased 
to provide irrigation water. It maintains its right, though, by leasing water to 
the municipal water company. The irrigation company pays no maintenance 
cost, does not pay taxes, and has absolutely no expense connected with the 
water delivery system. The municipality pays all costs and the irrigation 
company receives an annual "windfall" profit which it distributes to the share 
holders. The irrigation company makes no contribution yet receives benefits. 
The difference between this type of situation and an owner of land is that at 
the termination of the lease of land the owner still has title to a marketable 
substance. A water right on the other hand is dependent upon use. If the 
municipality were to terminate its lease in this case, the irrigation company 
would not be able to put the water to use either by itself or by lease to 
another customer. This is a physical restriction because the land has been 
subdivided and no other users or customers exist in that geographic setting. 
The right would therefore be lost by non-use. In this case the proper thing 
would be to let the title to the water "right" revert to the municipality. A 
water "privilege" concept would do away with type of abuse. 
5. Remove water utilities from control of the Public Service Commis-
sion. Private water utilities have not done well in Utah and one of the reasons 
is the stringent control imposed by the Public Service Commission. Rate 
control may be a way of life with the American consumer but arguments 
against such control can be justified. Because certain types of businesses must 
of necessity be operated as monopolies, fear of abuse has led consumers to 
accept governmental control agencies. Many forget, however, that, particu-
larly in the water business, governmental monopolies exist. Probably 90 
percent of the domestic water systems in Utah are governmental monopolies 
which do not come under the control of the Public Service Commission, and 
hence are without rate regulation. Besides rate control, though, the Public 
Service Commission practices a form of business restraint by limiting the 
number of customers which a water utility can serve. It is this type of control 
which must oe removed if this important social need is to truly become a 
business opportunity. 
6. Allow and encourage the formation of free market controlled water 
utilities. The essence of all the previous recommendations is to prepare the 
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way and make it possible for business to enter into the water distribution 
field. The product is not water rights and not even water per se. The product 
is and should be service! There may be many ways to structurally organize 
such a business but the intent must be always the same, to give service to a 
customer-to become society's organ for the discharge of the important social 
task of managing water resources. 
All organizations and institutions have power, and all of them exercise 
power. All, therefore, need to take responsibility for their actions. An 
organization is socially responsible when it satisfies society's needs through 
concentration on its own specific job. An organization is most responsible 
when it converts public needs into its own achievements. The organization 
may be "private" but the people at the head are certainly "public." 
39 
REFERENCES CITED 
Bain, Joe S., Richard E. Caves, and Julius Margolis. 1966. Northern California's Water 
industry. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press for Resources for the Future, Inc. 
Channing, William Ellery. 1829. In Christian Examiner, Vol. VII, Sept. 
Drucker, Peter F. 1969. The Age of Discontinuity. New York: Harper and Row, 
publishers. 
Drucker, Peter F. 1974. Management Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices. New York: 
Harper and Row, publishers. 
Haws, Frank W. 1973. A Study of Water Institutions in Utah and Their Influence on the 
Planning, Developing, and Managing of Water Resources. PUb. No. PRWG79-1, Utah 
Water Research Laboratory, Logan, Utah. 
Haynie, Richard A., Clement F. Tebbs, and Willard G. Smith (Certified Public 
Accountants). 1971. Accountants' Report, Salt Lake County Water Conservancy 
District. Salt Lake City, Utah. Jan. 
Hedy, Allen G., R. W. Mower, and C. Albert Harr. 1971. Water Resources of Salt Lake 
County. Tech. PUb. No. 31. State of Utah, Department of Natural Resources. 
U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation. 1965. Reclamation Repay-
ments and Payout Schedules. U.S. Govt. Ptg. Office, Washington, D.C. 
40 
APPENDIX 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION FOR MUNICIPAL 
WATER RIGHT TENURE IN UTAH 
by 
Trevor C. Hughes 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
Section 6 of Article XI of the Constitution of the State of Utah reads as 
follows: 
Sec. 6. (Municipalities forbidden to sell water-works or rights.) 
No municipal corporation, shall directly or indirectly, lease, sell, alien 
or dispose of any water-works, water rights, or sources of water supply 
now or hereafter to be owned or controlled by it; but all such water works, 
water-rights and sources of water supply now owned or hereafter to be 
acquired by any municipal corporation, shall be preserved, maintained and 
operated by it for supplying its inhabitants with water at reasonable 
charges. Provided, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to 
prevent any such municipal corporation from exchanging water rights, or 
sources of water supply, for other water-rights or sources of water supply 
of equal value, and to be devoted in like manner to the public supply of its 
inhabitants. 
This appears to be a provision which is unique to the State of Utah. The 
restriction applies to two very different items; water works and water rights. 
The language would appear, in the first case, to prevent municipalities from 
disposing of their physical facilities such as buried water pipelines, reservoirs, 
etc. This unusual requirement, however, has not caused any difficulty because 
it has apparently been largely ignored by the legal profession. Municipalities 
continually abandon deteriorated pipelines and remove and replace worn 
pumps and valves, etc. Because these items are normally replaced with equal 
or better equipment no one seems worried about the fact that a rigid 
interpretation of the Constitution would appear to prevent this sort of action. 
This is perhaps not surprising in view of the obvious chaos which would result 
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if cities were forced to maintain worn-out and obsolete equipment rather 
than replace it. What is surprising is that Section 6 is enforced rather strictly 
in regard to water rights and ignored in the case of water works; and this in 
spite of the fact that some degree of flexibility is added in the last sentence 
by the allowance for exchange of water rights of equal value but is silent in 
regard to "exchange of water works." 
Obviously Article 6 is in reality being interpreted to allow the exchange 
concept in regard to water works regardless of the language and this long 
established tradition essentially removes the potential danger. Even so, it 
would appear that a constitutional amendment to clarify this matter would 
be advisable. It is conceivable that a citizen or group, for example, which 
opposed a municipal water system renovation could force a court test of this 
provision on the basis that the new project included disposal of some existing 
equipment. This could cause serious delay of the project and expense to the 
city. This matter, however, as has been previously stated does not appear to 
be causing recurring problems and will not be treated further. The more 
serious impact of Article XI, Section 6, is in regard to water rights and the 
balance of this section will be addressed to this problem. 
It is easy to understand the intent of the framers of the Constitution in 
regard to this section. In this arid climate a source of water, particularly one 
which in its natural state was of a quality suitable for municipal use, was (and 
is) an extremely valuable right. The possibility of short-sighted municipal 
officials selling this valuable perpetual right during a period of excess water 
availability in order to obtain capital to solve more immediate fiscal problems 
was no doubt envisioned. The concept of preventing such action which could 
result in a future municipal water shortage (or significant cost to treat an 
alternative, lower quality source) is certainly a worthwhile goal. This was 
undoubtedly the objective of the writers of Article XI, Section 6 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
In practice, however, the rigidity of the language of this section causes 
numerous problems to municipal officials. In fact this rigidity can even have 
the effect of defeating efforts to upgrade the quality of municipal water 
supply rather than protecting it. 
Most municipal officials are well aware of the value of a water right in 
Utah. This is evidenced by the fact that most municipalities have long since 
acquired rights (in the form of approved applications to appropriate) to the 
available local high quality water such as spring flow and some groundwater. 
Use of these sources is almost invariably much cheaper than treating other 
poorer quality surface water. Acquiring an approved right to appropriate such 
water is very easy. It requires merely an application with the State Division of 
Water Rights. Since acquiring this "right to appropriate water" costs almost 
nothing, such applications have been filed by even the smallest communities 
in the state. The State Engineer has in general been lenient in approving 
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applications for large amounts of municipal water for several reasons: 1) It is 
difficult to assess the growth potential in municipal areas and city officials 
typically have an optimistic opinion of the prospects for growth in their 
community (evert in rural areas where the long term population trend has 
been negative). 2) Even with a stable population, water demand is increasing 
somewhat due to technology changes. 3) After the water source is developed 
and put to use the State Engineer requires a "proof of appropriation" which 
includes actual measurement of the flow being put to beneficial use. At this 
time the water right can be decreased below the amount actually shown in 
the application if the original amount was excessive. 
This brings up the question of whether an approved application actually 
constitutes a water right and is therefore subject to Article 6. In Utah, an 
approved application to appropriate right is considered to be a valuable 
inchoate right which may be defended in court. It is an unperfected right 
which is "in process of being perfected." It appears to be well established that 
an approved application does constitute a water right in the sense that a 
municipality, because of Article 6, cannot dispose of it. The fact that the 
quantity of flow approved in the application is subject to reduction as the 
right changes from the inchoate to the perfected form is simply a 
consequence of the state's appropriation procedure and is not subject to 
control by the officers of a municipality, and therefore, as a practical matter 
is not influenced by Article 6. 
Many communities have approved applications for water rights greatly in 
excess of their present needs. Their problem, however, is usually in financing 
the development of their resource. 
A large number of small communities in Utah constructtrl water supply 
systems during the early 1930's by means of WPA projects. Unfortunately, 
most of this effort was put into construction of distribution systems and the 
water source was usually a local creek or canal. Typically the only treatment 
was chlorination. Although some of the creeks produced reasonably good 
quality water during the 1930's (during at least part of the year), few, if any 
do now, and all of them experience serious contamination during storms. 
Regardless of quality during particular periods of the year, hazards, such as 
animal wastes in the creek channel above the diversion have caused the 
Division of Health, as a matter of policy, to classify any such system as being 
inadequate. Despite repeated warnings over many years by the Division of 
Health, many community officials have been unable to finance the necessary 
improvements in their systems. 
With this background, let us consider the plight of a typical small 
community in attempting to upgrade such a water system. The town may 
have an approved application for water or may actually own water in a 
quantity considerably in excess of its present needs. Frequently, other 
potential users, both public and private, exist which create a sellers' market 
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for high quality water. Many times these needs are small in terms of flow such 
as for campgrounds, resorts, or ranches. Because the cost of alternative 
sources of water may be very high, however, these other users may be willing 
to pay a surprisingly large amount to purchase a part of the town's water. 
This creates a potential source of financing a system which the town may be 
unable to finance alone. The town could dispose of a small fraction of its 
water right, still maintain a reasonable water reserve for future growth, and 
solve its critical fiscal and public health problems. It cannot presently do this, 
however, because of Article XI of the Constitution. Even a lease is considered 
unconstitutional unless it is renewed on approximately an annual basis. The 
potential outside user is not going to invest a substantial amount of capital in 
the town's system with only a guaranteed one-year tenure on his water right. 
It is the writer's opinion that this or very similar problems related to 
Article XI have confronted many Utah communities since World War II; nor 
are the problems associated with Article XI limited to small municipalities. 
Virtually all large cities have a market for their treated water due to growing 
demands in surrounding suburban areas. Frequently, due to economies of 
scale, and to superior water rights, the urban center could wholesale excess 
water to some of these other municipalities or water districts at a profit to 
the urban center and a savings over alternate sources to the other users. They 
can do so, however, only within a very restricted legal framework. On one 
hand there is a state statute, U.C.A. 1953, 10-8-14, which provides: 
They [cities) may construct, maintain and operate water-works ... or 
authorize the construction, maintenance and operation of the same by 
others, or purchase or lease such works from any person or corporation, 
and they may sell and deliver the surplus product or service ... not 
required by the city or its inhabitants, to others beyond the limits of the 
city. 
Cities may not, however, purchase water solely for resale, nor construct, 
own or manage facilities and equipment for distribution of water outside city 
limits as general business (U.C.A. 1953, 10-8-14). This somewhat con-
tradictory situation permits cities to sell "excess water" until it is needed by 
the growing city but does not permit any sort of long-term contract which 
provides security for the users outside the city (or security for th~ city in 
recovering their capital investment in water distribution facilities). Because of 
Article XI, Section 6, any such agreement is not constitutional, since it 
effectively constitutes disposing of the water right. Many cities in Utah are in 
fact selling their "excess" water to surrounding customers. A common means 
of accomplishing this is for the two parties to sign very short-term 
agreements. 
Substantial capital investment in buried supply lines are then necessary 
and are made with obvious belief that these short-term agreements will 
continue to be renewed. If such investments are entirely based upon formal 
short-term lease agreements, one wonders what informal "moral" agreements 
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have been negotiated between various parties. Obviously the potential danger 
of personality clashes threatening the continuity of such agreements as 
political administrations change periodically presents a very real danger. The 
opportunity for unethical political manuevering which these agreements 
present because of vulnerability of the water purchaser is itself sufficient 
reason to seek a change. 
It is not the intent of the writer to suggest termination of such water 
wholesaling but rather to completely legitimize it by allowing at least 
long-term leases with their accompanying security. \ 
One method which Salt Lake City has found to be useful in avoiding the 
constitutional restriction was the creation of the Metropolitan Water District 
of Salt Lake City (MWDSLC). A court case has established (Utah Code 
Annotated, Vol. I A. p. 295) that the restriction "applies only to cities, towns 
and villages and subdivisions of such cities, towns, and villages and does not 
apply to water conservancy districts, which are not mUnicipalities within the 
contemplation of that term as used in the constitution." The officers of the 
MWDSLC are appointed by the elected officials of Salt Lake City and the 
boundary of the district originally coincided with the municipal boundary. 
However, the district has been considered to be unrestricted by Article XI, 
Section 6, and it is presently wholesaling very large quantities of water to 
other utilities in Salt Lake County. This institutional arrangement provides 
considerable flexibility in use of water acquired by the city (through the 
district) after creation of the district; but it is not helpful to a city whose 
total right was acquired prior to formation of such a district. 
Another common way of avoiding the restriction is to exchange water 
rights. The courts have interpreted Article XI as allowing trades involving 
unequal quantities or intermittent water flows so long as the water acquired 
by the municipality has "equal value" to the water it disposes. Because of 
differences in water quality this provides some flexibility in exchanges. 
There are many situations, however, where such exchanges are not 
possible, as illustrated by the following case studies. 
Case Study No. 1-0eveland and Elmo, Utah: 
The towns of Cleveland and Elmo in northern Emery County obtained 
water systems by means of the WPA program during the 1930's. The 
groundwater in this area contains too much salt to be suitable for culinary 
use. These systems therefore obtain water from a local irrigation company, 
the Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Company. The water is diverted from a 
canal at a point near each town and used without treatment except for 
running it through small settling ponds. The quality of this water is 
completely unsuitable for culinary use and the State Division of Health has 
been attempting to get these communities to upgrade their systems for many 
years. 
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In 1967, a consultant was hired by a group oflocal residents to study the 
domestic water needs of the area of northern Emery County. The engineer's 
report indicated that the only source of suitable quality water for use without 
complete treatment was the flow from several small springs in Huntington 
Canyon, approximately 17 miles from Cleveland and 22 miles from Elmo. 
The construction cost of transporting this water from the springs to either 
town was completely prohibitive as an individual community project. 
However, by creating a single water utility which could serve the entire 
county area with one supply line from the canyon, it appeared that a feasible 
project could be developed. An alternate solution, involving diverting water 
closer to the service area and {relltlng-it was considered but this· wOUIif have 
cost more due to high operating costs and it would have continued the winter 
icing problems in the canals. 
In order to proceed with the project as recommended by the consultant, 
the local residents voted in 1970 to form a non-profit corporation called the 
North Emery Water Users Association. The plan was to construct a system 
costing $1,100,000, which would serve both the incorporated areas of 
Cleveland and Elmo, the unincorporated community of Lawrence and the 
largest possible number of farms in the area. The Association received almost 
unanimous support from the local residents-both inside and outside the 
incorporated areas-and soon more than 300 service connections had been 
purchased. A substantial grant from the Economic Development Administra-
tion and the Four Corners Regional Commission permitted fmancing the 
project at a reasonable cost to the users. A loan was obtained from the 
Farmers Home Administration for most of the balance of non-grant funds. 
The Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Company holds the water rights to 
virtually all of the flow from the Huntington Creek watershed. Since the 
springs which were proposed for development are in this watershed, the 
intent of the Association was to obtain the right to the spring· flow by 
purchasing the necessary stock in the Irrigation Company and obtaining 
permission from the State Division of Water Rights for a change of use and of 
point of diversion. The two municipalities already had sufficient stock in the 
irrigation company for their own residents (700 s1;tares) and it was the stated 
intention of both municipalities to allow the Association to deliver water 
represented by this stock through the proposed pipeline. It was believed that 
only a change \pf point of diversion would be required to accomplish 
tremendous increase in quality of water delivered to their residents. This 
meant that the only stock that would have to be actually purchased by the 
Association would be that for users outside the municipalities. This was 
agreeable to the State Division of Water Rights, the towns, the Association, 
and the Irrigation Company. 
The question remained: What type of formal agreement would be 
required between the towns and the Association in order to protect all the 
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interests involved? Because of Article XI, Section 6, the towns could not sell 
this stock to the Association. What was desired by all parties was a form of 
lease agreement where the Association would be able to deliver the water to 
the town users and bill them directly. The towns would still have to pay their 
usual annual assessment to the irrigation company but the Association's lease 
agreement would require it to reimburse the towns by an amount at least 
equal to the annual water assessment. The Association's attorney and 
engineer were well aware of the Constitutional prohibition on disposing of 
mUnicipal water rights but believed that surely, in a situation where all parties 
would obviOusly benefit, some type of lease agreement could be worked out 
for this purpose. To the great consternation o( all parties, however, it was 
finally determined that this could not be done. A short term renewable lease 
was not agreeable to the attorneys for the federal fmancing agencies. Since 
the project loan was to be fmanced over 40 years, these agencies insisted 
upon a lease of at least this duration to assure tenure of the water right held 
by the Association (and assigned to the federal government during the loan 
period). A lease of that duration, however, was not constitutional because it 
was interpreted by attorneys on both sides as amounting to disposing of the 
water right. 
The towns were therefore faced with the following spectacle: 1) They had 
a water right sufficient for their needs in terms of quantity but very poor in 
quality; 2) they had no apparent way to fmance, on their own, and means of 
improving their water quality; 3) because of economies of scale, a water 
association was able to deliver water to them which was completely 
acceptable to the .Board of Health at an average monthly cost to their users of 
$6/month compared to about $4 for the completely inadequate present 
system, provided that the towns' share of the irrigation company's water 
could be delivered through the Association's pipeline rather than the open 
canal; 4) because of Article XI of the Constitution the necessary legal 
arrangements could not be agreed upon and therefore the transfer could not 
be made. This incredible situation occurred in spite of the fact that the water 
would still have been used by the same families and the service to the towns 
would have been guaranteed by a franchise agreement between the towns and 
the Association. The Association would have had a stability guaranteed by 
the administrative, legal, and financial interest of the federal financing 
agencies, and the state agencies such as the Division of Health and Division of 
Water Rights. 
Clearly, the intent of the writers of the Constitution was not served in 
this case; rather, the rigid municipal water right clause appeared to require 
continuation of an intolerable situation in terms of public health. 
A solution was finally worked out in the following manner: The 
Association determined that the only course open to them short of 
abandoning the project was to attempt to purchase additional irrigation 
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company stock to replace the water planned to be furnished by the towns. 
This was a very difficult task because of the shortage of water in the area and 
because of the extra cost involved. The Association finally convinced enough 
potential customers outside of the municipal areas to sell a portion of their 
irrigation water and they purchased 768 shares rather than 165 shares. The 
additional cost of $10,854 had to come from local Association funds since 
neither the grant nor loan funds could be released until the water right was 
acquired. This very nearly stopped the project since the local groups share 
had· been almost completely used for preliminary engineering and right-of-
way costs. After several months delay the additional funds were raised, the 
stock sale was negotiated, and construction began in 1972. 
The two towns now have no use for their 700 shares of stock in the 
irrigation company. The market value of the stock at $18.00 per share is 
$12,600 but they cannot sell it because of the constitutional restriction. They 
now are faced with an annual operation and maintenance assessment from the 
irrigation company of at least $875 in perpetuity for water which they 
cannot use. 
One recourse open to the towns appears to be to refuse payment of the 
annual assessment. Over a period of time this would in reality constitute 
abandonment of their ownership of this stock. The irrigation company could 
then allow use of the water by other customers (perhaps even the domestic 
water association). Certainly tenure by such a user, however, would be 
uncertain and the value of the right would be much less than the market value 
of other stock. This is an example of the extent of administrative and legal 
gymnastics and the economic loss which municipalities in Utah are presently 
experiencing as a result of Article XI, Section 6. 
Case Study No. 2-Torrey, Utah: 
The town of Torrey, Wayne County, Utah, has a population of 
approximately 40 families. The town has over the years acquired water rights 
for municipal use to the flow from several springs which are located in the 
mountains above the town. Prior to 1968, the municipal water system 
consisted of a distribution system which diverted water from Sand Creek at a 
point near the town which was six miles from the springs which were the 
source of the creek flow. This highly contaminated water was then used with 
no treatment. 
In 1967, the town hired a consultant to plan a program of improving their 
water system. The resulting feasibility report indicated that development of 
the springs at the source· and construction of a pipeline to the town was the 
most economical method of upgrading the water quality. The town was able 
to obtain a 50 percent grant from the Farmer's Home Administration to 
apply to such a project, but even so, financing the balance of the construction 
cost appeared hopeless for the small town. 
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An apparent solution materialized in the form of the U.S. Forest Service. 
The proposed pipeline was to be constructed over several miles of public 
domain administered by the Forest Service. The right-of-way in fact went 
through a proposed future campground. The Forest Service was in the process 
of planning the campground facilities which were to include a culinary water 
system. The solution was obvious; the Forest Service would assist in fmancing 
the town system. In return, the town would allow the Forest Service to use a 
small portion of its water supply by prOviding an outlet at the campground. 
The town had approved applications from the State Division of Water 
Rights to develop and use all of the flow from Indian Spring which was above 
the forest campground. They also had the right to the flow from another 
large spring in a higher canyon and other smaller rights. The basis for this 
large water right was use for both municipal and irrigation purposes within 
the town area. The total water right represented approximately 1100 gallons 
per minute while the demand for municipal use was only about 40 gallons per 
minute. Obviously, the town could have allowed a small portion of their 
water to be used by the Forest Service and still have an ample reserve for even 
an unexpected future population explosion. 
It was at any rate an academic question, whether some tremendous future 
growth in the area could possibly result in a municipal water shortage. At 
some point during such growth an economic base would have been 
established which could have fmanced water developments from other, more 
distant sources, or treatment of local surface flow. The very real problem 
facing the town board and the State Division of Health in 1967 was how to 
finance a safe supply of drinking water for the 40 existing relatively low 
income families. 
Here again, Article XI, Section 6, very nearly scuttled the proposed 
improvements. The town was informed by the USDA attorney, acting in 
behalf of the funding agency that it could not sell or lease a part of its water 
to the federal government. After considerable delay (which caused threatened 
withdrawal of the 50 percent federal grant which had already been 
appropriated) a solution was reached. The Forest Service claimed a diligence 
right to a portion of the city's spring flow by virtue of grazing permits in the 
area. The State Engineer and cattlemen who happened to be sympathetic to 
the town's plight, allowed a questionable change of use for this water right 
from stock watering to campground use. In this manner the town was finally 
able to circumvent Section 6, and the project was finally allowed to proceed. 
Case Study No.3-Bountiful City: 
Bountiful City is one of the most rapidly growing cities on the Wasatch 
Front. It presently acquires water from several local wells and from the Weber 
Basin Water Conservancy District (WBWCD). It also has obtained rights to 
flow from nearby Millcreek Canyon which it is not yet using. 
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A recent planning study of the city's water system revealed that a large 
savings could be made (present worth of more than $600,000) if the city 
could dispose of its WBWCD water. The city had contIacted with the district 
in 1960 to purchase 1000 acre-fect of treated water. The term of the contract 
is 40 years. The increasing operation and maintenance costs charged by the 
district have caused this source of supply to become much more expensive 
than the two alternate sources. Because of the constitutional restriction, 
however, they cannot lease this water to other communities during the 
remainder of their contract. It is even doubtful that they can avoid renewing 
the contract in the year 2000 because this may well be interpreted as 
"disposing of an acquired water right." 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
It would appear that there is ample evidence that Article XI, Section 6, of 
the Utah State Constitution is counter productive and that a constitutional 
amendment is desirable. 
One possible solution would be outright elimination of this section. A 
second alternative would be to permit disposal of a municipal water right 
only after a 2/3 vote by the city residents. A third solution would be to 
require approval by the State Division of Water Rights, and/or the State 
Division of Water Resources. This, however, may be unconstitutional itself. 
Article VI, Section 29 provides that "the legislature shall not delegate to any 
special commission, ... any power to make, supervise or interfere with any 
municipal improvement, money, propert), or effects ... or to perform any 
municipal functions." This sort of approval would therefore have to be 
investigated carefully. It would appear, however, that the Division of Water 
Rights is already exercising broad powers affecting municipal property when 
it reduces the quantity of an approved water right application during the 
process of "peIfecting" it. 
Of the three alternate solutions suggested above, the second (voter 
approval) would likely be most attractive to the voters of the state and 
therefore most likely to accomplish approval of the constitutional amend-
ment. It would eliminate the problems now associated with Article XI, 
Section 6, and still retain a form of check and balance on the city officials 
without interference by a state agency. This course of action is therefore 
recommended. 
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NOTE 
Since Utah is the only state in the United States that has a constitutional 
restraint prohibiting municipalities from disposing of water rights, no possible 
harm could come to the municipalities if the first solution of Mr. Hughes 
were recommended and accepted. Complete repeal of Article XI, Section 6 
would probably be the best solution, therefore. 
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